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This Occasional Paper reviews the economic,
monetary and financial relations between the
EU and the euro area and countries in a broad
set of neighbouring regions. While in this
context the attention of policy-makers and
academics has recently focused on those
countries that are candidates for EU
membership, this paper goes beyond this
limited group. It focuses instead on a belt of
another about 80 countries that surround the
euro area in a broad geographical sense and
that are mostly classified as transition,
emerging market or developing economies.
These countries belong to four main regions:
the Western Balkans; the European part of the
Commonwealth of Independent States; the
Middle East and Northern Africa; and Sub-
Saharan Africa.
These countries are labelled, for the purposes
of this paper, as belonging to the “Euro Time
Zone” (ETZ), as most of them are within the
longitudes or time zones that broadly
correspond to those of the euro area. In many
respects, these countries are diverse,
belonging to different continents and having
reached different levels of economic
development. However, some common
features can also be identified. One of these
common features is the fact that the EU/euro
area is their largest trading partner and the
largest originator of international bank credit,
foreign direct investment and official
development assistance. From a euro area
perspective, these countries account for a
relatively small share of external trade, but
they are important as providers of energy,
other raw materials and agricultural products.
The paper analyses the relevant links at four
levels: institutional links, trade links, financial
links and monetary (i.e. exchange rate) links.
One of the features common to all the ‘ETZ’
countries is the fact that they enjoy special
relations with the European Union in
institutional terms: the EU has had a policy of
association with neighbouring countries since
the creation of the European Economic
Community in the 1950s, and has intensified
this policy since the late 1980s. Beyond more
general goals of political co-operation, these
agreements have been designed to strengthen
trade integration, open up the current (and in
some cases the capital) accounts and facilitate
direct investment in both directions. The ‘ETZ’
countries’ trade with the EU has been
characterised by the dominance of natural
resources, even if the share of manufactured
goods in EU imports from ‘ETZ’ countries
more than tripled between 1980 and 2000.
Turning to financial links, ‘ETZ’ countries are
relevant for euro area banks, as they account
for one third of the exposure to emerging
market economies.
The existence of monetary ties, i.e. the
importance of the euro in the countries’
exchange rate policies, seems to be a function
of the strength of the other ties. Those
countries with the most binding institutional
arrangements, the highest share of bilateral
trade and a significant presence of euro area
banks, are those that use the euro most
intensively as an anchor for their exchange
rate policies and/or as a parallel currency
alongside the domestic currency. This holds
particularly true for countries in the Western
Balkans and Northern Africa. Conversely,
countries with the least developed institutional
links, the lowest presence of euro area banks
and whose production structure is specialised
in raw materials (especially oil), tend to exhibit
no orientation to the euro, despite their
geographical proximity and – in some cases –
intense trade relations with the euro area.
This applies in particular to Russia, other CIS
countries and most countries in the Middle
East.
Executive summaryEconomic and institutional relations between
the euro area and the 13 countries that are
candidates for entry into the European Union1
(EU) have attracted considerable attention in
recent years. Their relations with the EU – in
the form of a particularly tight association in
the early 1990s, upgraded to an “accession
process” in the second half of the decade –
have been building blocks in the successful
transition from planned to market economies,
and have fostered a rapidly growing economic
and financial integration with the euro area.
For ten of these 13 countries, the accession
process will culminate in entry into the EU by
2004, marking the largest enlargement of the
EU in its 50-year history.
Much less emphasis has been given to the
economic links between the euro area, as the
fullest form of integration in the European
Union, and the wider semicircle of countries
to the east, south-east and south. The euro
area is, in a broad geographical sense,
surrounded by a belt of around 80 such
countries that are classified as transition,
emerging or developing economies. These
countries belong to four main regions: the
Western Balkans; the European part of the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
including Russia; the Middle East and Northern
Africa; and Sub-Saharan Africa. Some of the
countries in these regions, in particular those
in the CIS and the Balkans, are currently
engaged in a process of economic and
institutional transition from centrally planned
economies, following a path similar to the one
of most EU accession countries. Other
countries – especially on the southern border
of the Mediterranean, in the Middle East and in
Sub-Saharan Africa – have reached different
stages of economic development, but the
economic links between many of them and the
EU have intensified in recent years.
With respect to the EU and the euro area,
the 80 neighbouring countries in the
regions mentioned above share two other
characteristics besides geographic proximity.
First, they have a long history of tight
interaction with Europe which has given rise
to today’s economic and institutional relations;
second, they are formally associated with the
European Union by way of special agreements.
These agreements fall into four categories,
with each category being specifically designed
for each of the corresponding regions: the
Stabilisation and Association Agreements for
countries in the Western Balkans; the
Partnership and Co-operation Agreements for
Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent
States; the Mediterranean Agreements for
countries around the Mediterranean; and the
Yaoundé-Lomé-Cotonou type of agreements
for African countries (as well as for some
countries in the Caribbean and the Pacific,
which are not dealt with in this paper). Many
of these institutional arrangements have
important economic implications insofar as
one of their central aims is to foster trade and
financial relations between the EU/euro area
and the countries concerned.
This paper reviews the economic aspects of
the institutional arrangements and analyses
economic relations – i.e. trade, financial and
monetary (exchange rate) links – between the
EU/euro area and the set of around 80
countries in the four regions mentioned
above. As the countries in these four regions
together are broadly located within the time
zones or degrees of longitude roughly
corresponding to those of the euro area
(Central European Time –2/+3 hours), this
paper uses the term “Euro Time Zone” (ETZ)
as an ad hoc label for the entire group of
countries.
It should be recognised that while the ‘ETZ’ is
used as a summary label, there is an obvious
degree of arbitrariness in subsuming some
80 countries under the same heading;
hence, the term is used in quotation marks
throughout. It is indeed one of the aims of the
paper to explore whether and how the factors
considered before – broad geographical
proximity to the euro area and an extensive
set of institutional links with the EU – are
reflected in a particular network of economic
links between the euro area and its
neighbouring regions in a broad sense.
1 Introduction
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1 Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Turkey.Some of the issues dealt with in this paper are
similar to those sometimes addressed in more
formalised approaches (gravity models of
international trade, cluster analysis, etc.). The
paper is, however, intentionally more descriptive
and offers a large amount of qualitative
and quantitative information extracted from
different sources. It does not seek to formalise
intensity indicators of relations with ‘ETZ’
regions, or to compare them with other regions
of the world.
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2
highlights the main features of the four regions
and their multidimensional factors of closeness
to the euro area. Section 3 analyses the
institutional links between the EU and the
regions of the ‘ETZ’. Sections 4 and 5 focus on
the economic links, considering trade and
financial linkages. Section 6 reviews exchange
rate and monetary policies in the ‘ETZ’
countries. Section 7 draws some tentative
conclusions from the analysis.
ECB • Occasional Paper Series No. 7 • December 2002 7Egypt  Libya 
Tunisia  Morocco 
Saudi Arabia 
































Commonwealth of Independent States 




Centr. Afr. Rep. 
Nigeria 







“Euro Time Zone” countries
ECB • Occasional Paper Series No. 7 • December 2002 8For the purposes of this paper, the countries
located in time zones close to that of the euro
area (Central European Time –2/+3 hours)
are considered as belonging to the “Euro Time
Zone” (ETZ).2 The ‘ETZ’ comprises 81
countries, has 20% of the world’s population,
but as a whole accounts for only 5% of world
GDP. This imbalance between GDP and
population shares reflects, among other things,
the sharp contrast in the level of economic
development between ‘ETZ’ countries and the
euro area (which accounts for only 5% of the
world’s population but 20% of world GDP).
2 ‘ETZ’ regions and their closeness to
the euro area
ECB • Occasional Paper Series No. 7 • December 2002 9




Albania Croatia FR Yugoslavia
Bosnia and Herzegovina FYR Macedonia
European CIS: (8)
Armenia Belarus Kazakhstan Russia
Azerbaijan Georgia Moldova Ukraine
Middle East and Northern Africa: (19)
Algeria Israel Morocco Syria
Bahrain Jordan Oman Tunisia
Egypt Kuwait Palestinian Territories1) United Arab Emirates
Iran Lebanon Qatar Yemen
Iraq Libya Saudi Arabia
Sub-Saharan Africa: (49)
Angola Djibouti Madagascar Senegal
Benin Equatorial Guinea Malawi Seychelles
Botswana Eritrea Mali Sierra Leone
Burkina Faso Ethiopia Mauritania Somalia
Burundi Gabon Mauritius South Africa
Cameroon Gambia Mayotte Sudan
Cape Verde Ghana Mozambique Swaziland
Central African Rep. Guinea Namibia Tanzania
Chad Guinea-Bissau Niger Togo
Comoros Kenya Nigeria Uganda
Congo, Dem. Rep. Lesotho Rwanda Zambia
Congo, Rep. Liberia São Tomé & Príncipe Zimbabwe
Côte d’Ivoire
1 The Palestinian Territories (West Bank and Gaza), while not a sovereign state, belong to the so-called partners in the EU’s
Barcelona Process (partnership with 12 Mediterranean countries and territories, see 2.2), and are thus included in this Box.
2 While the northern, southern and western borders of the ‘ETZ’
are clear, there are uncertainties as to the exact location of the
eastern border. This could be set so as to include Iran as part
of the Middle East, along with Russia, Kazakhstan, all Black Sea
countries and all that are west of the Caspian Sea. Given that
80% of Russia’s population lives to the west of the Ural
Mountains, this justifies the inclusion of Russia in the ‘ETZ’. In
any event, it has to be acknowledged that this delineation is
somewhat arbitrary: for instance, Turkmenistan has not been
included whereas Kazakhstan is part of the ‘ETZ’, even though
both countries border the Caspian Sea. The inclusion of
Kazakhstan in the ‘ETZ’ is justified by its close links with Russia.Table 2.1
“Euro Time Zone” - Population and GDP in 2001
Population As % of world GDP As % of
Region (million) population (USD billions) world GDP
Western Balkans1) 24.8 0.4 32.1 0.1
European CIS 239.9 3.9 393.9 1.3
MENA2) 317.7 5.2 826.0 2.7
Sub-Saharan Africa 687.2 11.3 312.8 1.0
All ‘ETZ’ countries 1,269.6 20.8 1,564.8 5.1
Memorandum:
Euro area 303.1 5.0 6,089.9 19.6
Non-euro area EU 74.2 1.2 1,795.7 5.8
Accession countries 170.7 2.8 410.7 1.3
Other European countries 12.0 0.2 418.2 1.3
World 6,085.7 - 31,049.3 -
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook.
1) GDP data for the Western Balkans excluding Yugoslavia.
2) GDP data for MENA excluding Iraq.
The Middle East and Northern Africa (MENA)
is the most important of the four ‘ETZ’
regions in economic terms. Its GDP exceeds
the combined GDP of the Western Balkans,
the European CIS and Sub-Saharan Africa.
However, it has only one-quarter of the four
regions’ overall population, pointing to its
comparatively higher income level. In contrast,
Sub-Saharan Africa accounts for more than
one-half of the four regions’ population, but
contributes only 20% to their overall GDP,
reflecting the fact that it has the lowest level
of economic development in the ‘ETZ’.
The remainder of this section gives a brief
overview of the regions constituting the ‘ETZ’
and identifies the major links between the four
regions and the euro area.
2.1.1 The Western Balkans
The five states referred to in this paper as
constituting the “Western Balkans” (Albania,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia and the Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) are, with the
exception of Albania (and together with
Slovenia) the successor countries of the
former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
What remains of the Yugoslav federation
today is the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
which comprises two member states, Serbia
and Montenegro. Further to an agreement
signed on 14 March 2002 under the auspices
of the EU between the two member states –
which is still presently undergoing ratification –
the FR Yugoslavia is expected to become a
new federation called “Serbia and
Montenegro”. Kosovo is also formally a
territory of the FR Yugoslavia, but it is now
administered by the United Nations Mission in
Kosovo – UNMIK – following UN Security
Council Resolution no. 1244 of 1999.
The population of the five Western Balkan
countries totals 25 million. Internally, the
region remains highly fragmented from an
ethnic point of view. No other European
region saw more conflict in the 20th century
and, according to the European Commission,
at least 200,000 people perished during the
wars of the 1990s. The United Nations (Office
of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees – UNHCR) estimates that 2 million
people are still displaced in the area. Croatia
has the largest GDP per capita, whereas the
other countries show income levels far below
those of the euro area.
ECB • Occasional Paper Series No. 7 • December 2002 10Looking ahead, all countries in the region are
exposed to serious economic challenges:
• First, war has had catastrophic
consequences on all countries’ economies.
Poverty has become a real issue. In FR
Yugoslavia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, in
particular, output stood in 1999 at 50% of
its 1989 (pre-war) level.
• Second, while more dynamic growth is
needed, the countries are not in a position
to finance reconstruction and remain
heavily dependent upon foreign aid.
• Third, a deep reform of the financial sector
is required everywhere. Reform has made
progress in FYR Macedonia and Croatia,
and seems to accelerate in the FR
Yugoslavia, whereas it is proceeding at a
slower pace in Albania and Bosnia-
Herzegovina.
In order to re-establish conditions of growth,
Western Balkan countries are pursuing
regional co-operation policies in parallel with a
strategy of gradual integration into EU
structures. Such co-operation has been
encouraged by the international donor
community with the creation of the Stability
Pact for South Eastern Europe:
• The Stability Pact includes all countries of
South-East Europe, the EU and its Member
States, the other G10 countries and the
international financial institutions. It is a
network for the co-ordination of all
international and regional players, created
with the additional aim of enhancing
regional co-operation and initiating projects
with a specific regional feature in the
Western Balkans and in neighbouring areas.
• Two regional funding conferences have
successfully taken place in 2000 and 2001.
The donor community undertook to
provide some USD 5.4 billion to finance
projects of interest for the reconstruction
of the region.
• Under the auspices of the Stability Pact for
South Eastern Europe, the ministers of
trade and economy of Albania, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, FYR
Macedonia, Romania and FR Yugoslavia
signed a Memorandum of Understanding in
June 2001 seeking to fully liberalise trade in
the area through a network of bilateral
agreements.
2.1.2 The Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS)
The CIS was set up in 1991, embracing all the
internationally acknowledged states that
emerged from the former Soviet Union, with
the exception of the three Baltic states. It is a
rather loose framework for political and
economic integration in the region. The heads
of state meet once a year, while other
committees within the CIS have gradually been
set up (e.g. since 1993 the finance ministers
have met regularly in the framework of an
Economic Committee). However, the CIS is
not an institution endowed with decision-
ECB • Occasional Paper Series No. 7 • December 2002 11
Table 2.2
Population, income and growth in the Western Balkans
Average annual 
Population 2001 GDP GDP per capita growth rate
Country (million) (USD billions) 2001 (USD) 1992-2001
Albania 3.4 3.9 1,159 5.4
Bosnia and Herzegovina 3.9 4.3 1,103 n.a.
Croatia 4.8 20.4 4,234 1.6
FYR Macedonia 2.0 3.4 1,650 -0.6
FR Yugoslavia 8.6 1) 10.9 1,270 n.a.
Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook, EBRD (2002), IMF (2002).
1) Excluding Kosovo population.making powers.3 The CIS countries considered
in this paper are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus,
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Russia and
Ukraine.
Russia is by far the most influential country in
the CIS, having a population 50% larger than
those of the other seven European CIS
countries put together. Moreover, its GDP is
four times higher than the combined figure for
the other countries. The rather uneven
distribution of per capita incomes reflects (i)
long-term development trends, including the
legacy of Soviet economic policies and (ii) the
uneven distribution of natural resources.
Whereas Belarus, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia
and Moldova do not have any significant raw
material reserves, Russia, Kazakhstan and
Azerbaijan are energy-rich countries and are
major producers and exporters of oil and gas
(EBRD, 2001). Russia holds one-third of all
proven gas reserves world-wide and its oil
reserves are estimated to amount to 4.6% of
total world reserves and 12.8% of reserves
outside the Middle East.
All CIS countries underwent a deep transition
recession in the early 1990s which was much
more severe than in most EU accession
countries. Whereas growth resumed in the
Caucasian states as early as the mid-1990s,
Kazakhstan, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine only
saw their first year of significant positive
growth in 1999/2000. Since then, however, the
region has been experiencing strong growth,
supported by high commodity prices, the
depreciation of the Russian rouble after the
1998 financial crisis, generally prudent
macroeconomic policies and buoyant domestic
demand. Structural reforms have gained
momentum in all countries with the exception
of Belarus, although an extensive transition
and reform agenda remains, in particular in the
area of corporate governance and financial
sector reform.
2.1.3 The Middle East and Northern
Africa
The Middle East and Northern Africa (MENA)
is a highly heterogeneous region in terms of
population and wealth, but also in terms of
political structure. With more than 65 million
inhabitants each, the most heavily populated
countries are Iran and Egypt, whereas eight
countries have a population of less than five
million. GDP per capita ranges from USD 400
in Yemen to USD 28,000 in Qatar. Oil
ECB • Occasional Paper Series No. 7 • December 2002 12
Table 2.3
Population, income and growth in the European CIS
Average annual 
Population 2001 GDP GDP per capita growth rate
Country (million) (USD billions) 2001 (USD) 1992-2001
Armenia 3.8 2.1 557 -2.1
Azerbaijan 7.9 4.5 720 -3.3
Belarus 9.4 11.4 1,211 0.0
Georgia 5.2 3.2 608 -4.9
Kazakhstan 14.9 22.2 1,501 -0.9
Moldova 4.3 1.6 369 -7.1
Russia 145.2 309.9 2,135 -3.7
Ukraine 49.1 37.6 765 -5.9
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook.
3 Furthermore, over the last decade other sub-regional
communities have been founded, such as the Russia-Belarus
Union, the Association between Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan,
Azerbaijan and Moldova (GUUAM) and the Eurasian Economic
Community (EAEC) bringing together Russia, Belarus,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Whereas Russia and
Belarus are seeking to establish a future common citizenship
and a monetary union, the GUUAM group and the EAEC have
more modest aims, focusing on trade and general economic
and political co-operation. In all three cases, however, tangible
results have been very limited so far. In addition, there are a
few regional conflicts threatening political stability and economic
development, for example in the separatist regions of
Transdniestria in Moldova, and Abkhazia and South Ossetia in
Georgia, and the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over
Nagorno-Karabakh.resources are the major determinant of wealth
in the region and are distributed unevenly
across countries. MENA includes some of the
most important oil-producing countries, like
Saudi Arabia and Iran, and almost 70% of the
world’s proven oil reserves are concentrated
in the region. The wealth gap within MENA
creates migration pressure both within the
region and from several MENA countries to
Europe. With the exception of some small oil-
producing countries, Israel is the only high-
income country with a development level
comparable to that of Western Europe. Its
GDP per capita amounts to approximately
three-quarters of the euro area average figure,
and is thus higher than in some euro area
member states. Israel is also the only highly
industrialised country in the region (and
indeed in the entire “Euro Time Zone”). In
terms of overall GDP, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Israel
and Egypt are by far the largest economies.
Growth performance in the region is very
diverse, but generally less dynamic than in key
emerging market economies.
The Arab League is a regional framework for
political and economic integration consisting of
22 Arab states. Within the Arab League, the
Arab Monetary Fund fosters monetary co-
operation. However, the Arab framework
does not include Iran or, of course, Israel, two
major players in the region, and suffers from a
lack of political coherence. Other frameworks
for regional integration are the Arab Maghreb
Union (AMU: Algeria, Libya, Mauritania,
Morocco, Tunisia) which has not made much
progress due to internal political conflicts, and
the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC: Bahrain,
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United
Arab Emirates). The GCC, so far the most
successful framework for regional integration,
intends to establish a customs union in 2003,
and to introduce a single currency in 2010.
2.1.4 Sub-Saharan Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa is a highly heterogeneous
area in terms of population and wealth. It
comprises 49 African countries, including the
islands of Madagascar, Comoros, Cape Verde,
Mauritius and Seychelles. By far the most
highly populated country is Nigeria, with 132
million inhabitants. The second country in
terms of population size, South Africa (45
million), is however the largest in terms of
output, and accounts for approximately one-
third of the GDP of the African continent as a
whole. Notwithstanding South Africa’s smaller
population and larger economy relative to
Nigeria, and excluding Seychelles whose
economy is driven by tourism, GDP per capita
in Sub-Saharan Africa is highest in Gabon and
Equatorial Guinea, both of which are endowed
with natural resources, oil in particular.
Most Sub-Saharan African countries, however,
are classified as low-income economies.
Moreover, richer countries like Gabon and
South Africa, whose level of economic
development is similar to that of some
European countries, exhibit high income
inequalities.
Integration projects have been high on the
agenda of Sub-Saharan Africa countries since
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Table 2.4
Population, income and growth in selected MENA countries
Average annual 
Population 2001 GDP GDP per capita growth rate
Country (million) (USD billions) 2001 (USD) 1992-2001
Algeria 30.9 54.9 1,775 2.2
Egypt 66.4 96.8 1,456 4.2
Iran 68.5 114.1 1,665 4.1
Israel 6.4 110.5 17,335 4.5
Morocco 29.2 33.5 1,147 2.4
Saudi Arabia 21.3 166.7 7,822 1.4
Tunisia 9.7 20.0 2,059 4.9
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook.independence in the 1960s, but results so far
have been mixed. For instance, African
countries decided further to the Lusaka
summit in July 2001 to overhaul the
Organisation for African Unity (OAU), an
international organisation created in 1963
including 53 African states, and to create an
“African Union”.4 Four other major regional
integration frameworks exist in Sub-Saharan
Africa: the Southern African Development
Community (SADC), the Economic
Community of West African States
(ECOWAS), the CEMAC (Communauté
Economique et Monétaire de l’Afrique Centrale)
and the UEMOA (Union Economique et
Monétaire Ouest Africaine). All four fora have
addressed monetary co-ordination explicitly,
most notably the CEMAC and the UEMOA,
which form the CFA franc zone, and the five
English-speaking countries of ECOWAS where
a monetary union project has recently made
its first steps.
The potential for integration remains
considerable, and is one of the key objectives
of the Lomé Conventions and of the Cotonou
Agreement (see section 3). Indeed, a large
majority of countries in the region belong to
the “ACP group” (the African, Caribbean and
Pacific countries), with which the EU has
developed privileged trade and financial
relations through international agreements.
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Table 2.5
Population, income and growth in selected countries of Sub-Saharan Africa
Average annual 
Population 2001 GDP GDP per capita growth rate
Country (million) (USD billions) 2001 (USD) 1992-2001
Benin 6.5 2.4 372 4.9
Burkina Faso 12.7 2.5 196 3.8
Cameroon 15.8 8.5 542 2.4
Central African Republic 4.0 1.0 246 1.7
Chad 7.7 1.6 209 3.3
Côte d’Ivoire 17.5 10.4 595 2.5
Equatorial Guinea 0.5 1.9 4,079 27.2
Gabon 1.2 4.6 3,743 1.2
Guinea-Bissau 1.2 0.0 200 1.2
Mali 11.4 2.6 227 4.1
Niger 11.1 1.9 173 2.1
Nigeria 131.6 41.1 311 2.7
Republic of the Congo 3.0 2.9 964 1.6
Senegal 9.9 4.6 467 4.0
South Africa 44.9 111.7 2,490 2.1
Togo 4.9 1.3 255 1.9
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook.
This table covers the two key countries (Nigeria and South Africa) and the 14 CFA franc zone countries.
By definition, the main common feature shared
by all ‘ETZ’ countries is their relative
geographic proximity to the euro area.
However, besides distance, other factors
define closeness to the euro area: history,
institutional and political co-operation, and
economic and financial relations.
As regards the closeness of the Western
Balkans to the euro area, it is interesting to
note that during the Cold War, prior to the
break-up of Yugoslavia, the region – Albania
excepted – had been relatively open to the
West, in the framework of the Non-Aligned
Movement of which former Yugoslav President
Tito was one of the founders. During the last
2.2 Multi-dimensional factors of closeness to the euro area
4 One of the aims of which is to create a common currency and
a common central bank within the next 20 years. Indeed, the
central banks of the member countries met to this end in
August 2001.decade links with Western Europe
experienced a setback because of the conflicts
in the region. Also in institutional terms, it was
not until recently that the Western Balkans
benefited from association agreements with
the EU similar to those that had been offered
to central and eastern European countries in
the early 1990s. Only in recent years, after
free elections were held in Croatia and Serbia,
have institutional and political relations with
the EU gathered momentum. Through the
arrangement of new tailor-made institutional
frameworks for this area (the Stabilisation and
Association Agreement; the Stability Pact for
South Eastern Europe), countries in the region
are endeavouring to open a perspective of
future integration in the European Union.
Notwithstanding ups and downs in institutional
and political relations, the euro today plays a
key role in all the exchange rate regimes of
the region, and the EU is the main trading
partner of all five countries.
The relations between the EU and today’s
members of the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS) developed during the
1970s along the lines of the so-called
Ostpolitik (both bilaterally, between the EU
Member States and the then Soviet Union, as
well as multilaterally, for instance through the
so-called Helsinki Process). The then European
Community concluded trade co-operation
agreements with the Soviet Union in the
1980s. However, only after the collapse of the
Soviet Union did relations gain momentum.
Partnership and Co-operation Agreements
(PCAs), based on the respect of democratic
principles and human rights, setting out the
political, economic and trade relationship with
the EU and its partner countries have been
signed with European CIS countries. In
general, ties between the EU and the
European CIS are heavily influenced by (i) the
fact that the EU accession of central and
eastern European countries is in an advanced
state, and as a result some CIS countries will
have a much longer common border with the
EU in the near future, and (ii) the importance
of Russia, both in political and economic
terms. Russia is the EU’s sixth-largest world
trading partner and is by far the largest trading
partner of the EU among the ‘ETZ’ countries,
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Box 2.2
Other factors of ‘ETZ’ countries’ closeness to the euro area
– Historical ties
In many cases the relations between euro area countries and ‘ETZ’ countries are based on historical ties. For
example, the close monetary link between the 14 countries of central and western Africa forming the CFA
franc zone, which have a fixed parity to the euro, is basically explained by these countries’ colonial past and
the special relationship they have preserved with France since their independence.
– Institutional and political co-operation
Since the significant “wave of independence” of former colonies in the 1960s, the EU has developed a
comprehensive policy of co-operation agreements with various regions of the world. Institutional and
political co-operation is especially close with the regions bordering the EU. Examples are the Barcelona
Process with Mediterranean countries and the Lomé agreements with African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP)
countries (recently replaced by the Cotonou agreement).
– Economic and financial indicators
Economic, financial and monetary variables are of primary importance when assessing the closeness of a
given country to the euro area. Trade plays a crucial role in this regard, followed by financial flows, in
particular in the form of foreign investment. With respect to the public sector, the extent of official
development assistance is another indicator of closeness. Finally, the role of the euro in third countries’ and
entities’ exchange rate regimes deserves attention as it usually reflects the degree of economic and financial
integration.as well as being a major supplier of gas and oil
and the largest debtor of euro area banks
among the ‘ETZ’ countries. Meanwhile, the EU
is Russia’s main trading partner and its largest
creditor.
Relations between Europe and the Middle East
and Northern Africa have developed since the
1970s. In order to open a new phase of
regional co-operation, in 1995 the European
Union and 12 Mediterranean partners
launched the so-called Barcelona Process,
which sought to create a new framework for
partnership between the EU and Algeria,
Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta,
Morocco, the Palestinian Territories, Syria,
Tunisia and Turkey. The three main topics of
the Barcelona Process are: (i) political and
security partnership, (ii) economic and financial
partnership, (iii) partnership in social, cultural
and human affairs. One of the objectives of the
Barcelona Process is to create a Euro-
Mediterranean Free-Trade Area (target date:
2010). However, according to most analysts
the Barcelona-Process has not fulfilled
expectations so far, as reflected, for example,
in the low rate of disbursements from financial
programmes, the slow progress in
implementing Association Agreements and the
difficulties encountered in drafting a Charter
for Stability and Security. The heterogeneity of
the 12 partners involved in the process, in
both political and economic terms, is often
seen as a major problem. Moreover, the
unresolved Middle East conflict is an
impediment to the Euro-Mediterranean
dialogue. Notwithstanding these difficulties, for
the Middle East and Northern Africa as a
whole and for most of the countries it covers,
the EU is by far the most important trading
partner. Trade links with Mediterranean
countries, especially the Maghreb, are
particularly strong. Ties with the Arab
Peninsula are comparatively less developed,
although the EU did conclude a co-operation
agreement with the Gulf Co-operation
Council in 1989, which contains a commitment
to enter into negotiations on a Free Trade
Agreement.
Most Sub-Saharan African countries have
strong historical ties to Europe as most of
them were once European colonies. European
languages are widely used, even as official
languages. Furthermore, many countries have
preserved special ties with their former
colonial power after independence, such as the
Commonwealth of Nations for former British
colonies, and the framework of Francophone
summits. More importantly from a monetary
point of view, the 14 countries of the CFA
franc zone have maintained a fixed parity
against the euro, and the EU is by far the most
important trading partner for most countries
in the region. For instance, it accounts for
more than 40% of the CFA franc zone
countries’ external trade. In addition, about
one-third of South Africa’s and Nigeria’s
external trade is conducted with the EU.
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set up a well-established institutional
framework underpinning its relations with the
countries in the “Euro Time Zone” (ETZ). The
founding fathers of the then European
Economic Community (EEC) pursued
objectives of openness and solidarity vis-à-vis
countries that were particularly close to
Europe, both geographically and historically.
Europe developed these relations according to
the principles of preferential trade relations,
financial aid, the transfer of know-how and
support for economic and social development.
Recently, dialogue on foreign and security
policies has been added to the EU’s external
relations.
The EU’s institutional links are clearly focused
on neighbouring regions. Although a number
of agreements exist with countries in other
areas of the world (e.g. trade agreements with
Latin American countries), the full multi-
dimensional network of institutional relations
described in this section has been developed
only with the four regions subsumed under
the ‘ETZ’ heading.
• With the so-called “Western Balkan”
countries (Albania and the former Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, excluding
Slovenia) the EU has signed, or is presently
about to negotiate, Stabilisation and
Association Agreements.
• With Russia and the former Soviet
republics (excluding the three Baltic States)
the EU has concluded Partnership and
Co-operation Agreements.
• With the countries surrounding the
Mediterranean, the EU has concluded or is
negotiating Euro-Mediterranean Agreements.
• With almost all countries of Sub-Saharan
Africa (as well as several countries from the
Caribbean and the Pacific) the EU has
entered into the Cotonou Agreement, the
last of a long series of agreements signed in
Yaoundé and Lomé since the early 1960s.
This typology of four different types of
agreement5 did not exist until a few years ago.
Originally, the European Economic Community
had only two categories of relations: (i)
association agreements, “involving reciprocal
rights and obligations, common actions and
special procedures”, and (ii) other co-
operation agreements, of a less binding and
more specific nature.
Today, the EU has de facto overcome the
original dichotomy of the EEC bilateral
agreements between association and co-
operation, since relations with all four ‘ETZ’
regions – despite the different labelling with
four types of agreement – share the common
design of increasing integration between the
European Union and its neighbouring areas.
The aim of this section is to illustrate the four
types of agreements in order to draw some
conclusions on elements common to them.
3 Institutional links
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The Stabilisation and Association Agreements
(SAAs) with countries in the Balkans have the
most far-reaching implications since their
preambles attribute explicitly to the
signatories the status of “potential candidate
for EU membership”, a status also approved
by the European Council in Feira in June 2000.
Independently of whether Western Balkan
countries will be offered candidate status in
the future, the degree of integration sought in
the SAAs is deeper than with any other non
EU-country.
SAAs seek the gradual development of a free
trade area between the EU and the Western
Balkans. At the end of a 10-year transition
phase the associated partners will be part of a
3.1 “Stabilisation and Association Agreements” with the
Western Balkans
5 The European Union has concluded other co-operation
agreements with other ‘ETZ’ countries (e.g. with the member
states of the Gulf Cooperation Council and Yemen). free trade area for goods and services.6 Balkan
countries will also implement rules on the
establishment of companies, capital movements,
competition, intellectual property and public
contracts with the EU. The agreements
additionally establish the right for Community
credit institutions and other providers of
financial services to receive “a treatment no less
favourable than that accorded to own companies
or to any third country company, whichever is
the better”.7 As with intra-EU rules on the free
circulation of services, credit institutions will
benefit from the right of free establishment in
the EU and in the Balkans, based on the mutual
recognition of bank licences.
A financial programme called CARDS8
supports SAA agreements with grants of d4.6
billion for the period 2000-2006. CARDS is
focused “mainly on building up an institutional,
legislative, economic and social framework
directed at the values and models subscribed
to by the European Union and on promoting a
market economy”. The European Investment
Bank has also extended d350 million-worth of
loans to the region. Finally, the EU has
established a European Agency for
Reconstruction in 2000, to which it may
delegate the implementation of CARDS.
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Box 3.1
Stabilisation and Association Agreements
In force Signed, not yet ratified Negotiated, not yet signed Negotiations yet to start
None FYR Macedonia1) Albania (preliminary) Bosnia and Herzegovina
Croatia1 Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (preliminary)
1  “Interim Agreements”, anticipating trade liberalisation, have come into force prior to the ratification of the broader
agreements.
Partnership and Co-operation Agreements
(PCAs) were designed in the early 1990s,
shortly after the start of CIS countries’
transition from planned to market economies.
They aim for a relatively low degree of
integration between the EU and the respective
countries. For instance, they do not contain
any direct commitment to progress towards a
free trade area, although they do seek “to
create the necessary conditions for the future
establishment of a free trade area”. In fact,
they state that such a development shall only
be put into effect by virtue of “new
agreements between the parties”. For this
reason, any progress towards the free
movement of capital in PCAs is conditional
upon and restricted by exception clauses (e.g.
the right of free establishment for credit
institutions is stated in the text of PCAs, but
subject to limitations, such as a ceiling on
foreign ownership of the banking system).
PCAs are supported through the financial
programme TACIS9, which promotes
transition to a market economy and the
strengthening of democracy and the rule of
law in the partner States. In 1991-1999, total
commitments to all CIS countries amounted
to  d4.2 billion. For the period 2000-2006,
d3.1 billion has been earmarked.
In view of the latest progress made by some
CIS economies towards more stable economic
conditions, PCAs might now need new and
more ambitious targets. For instance, the
3.2 “Partnership and Co-operation Agreements” with CIS countries
6 Free trade for goods only applies to industrial goods; trade
liberalisation for agricultural goods is not foreseen in the current
agreements.
7 Stabilisation and Association Agreement with FYR Macedonia
(article 48).
8 Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and
Stabilisation.
9 Technical Assistance to countries in the Commonwealth of
Independent States.European Union and Russia have established a
High-Level Group to examine the concept of a
“Common European Economic Space”, seeking
to further integrate the EU and Russian
economies on the basis of legislative
harmonisation, regulatory convergence and the
gradual development of a free trade area. This
would give a new dimension to the EU’s
relations with Russia.
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Box 3.2
Partnership and Co-operation Agreements








The then European Economic Community
signed the Ankara Agreement with Turkey as
long ago as 1963 and granted association
status to four Mediterranean countries
(Cyprus, Malta, Morocco and Tunisia) in the
early 1970s. However, the long-standing
relationship between the two sides of the
Mediterranean sea took shape only with the
3.3 “Euro-Mediterranean Agreements”
Box 3.3
The EU’s relations with Russia
The bi-annual EU-Russia Summits – attended by the Presidents of the European Commission and the
Russian Federation, as well as by the head of state or government of the country holding the rotating
presidency of the European Union – are the highest level form of institutional co-operation.
The “Co-operation Council between the European Communities and their member states, on the one part,
and the Russian Federation, on the other part” has regularly convened every year since its first meeting in
January 1998, shortly after the entry into force of the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement. Trade
(including customs co-operation, foreign direct investment, WTO entry) and economic co-operation
(structural reforms) are issues permanently on the agenda judging by the joint communiqués published after
the meetings.
At a technical level, the EU-Russia “Subcommittee on Economic, Financial Issues and Statistics” has
regularly discussed economic policies in the EU and in Russia, under the joint chairmanship of the
European Commission’s Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs and Russia’s Ministry of
Economy.
In order to pursue its policy vis-à-vis Russia, the European Union has identified a medium-term strategy
(the “Common Strategy on Russia”, approved by the European Council of Ministers in June 1999), which
sets out the principles, instruments and means of the EU policy. One of the pillars of the Common Strategy
is the “integration of Russia into a common European economic and social area”. Moreover, in 2000 the
Russian government approved a “Strategy towards the European Union 2000-2010”.Euro-Mediterranean Agreements (EMAs), an
integral part of the so-called Barcelona
Process. EMAs do not imply, however, that
these countries have the status of candidate
countries.10
The EMAs pursue the goal of a gradual
development of a free trade area after a 12-
year transition phase.11 They also set out some
rules on the establishment of companies,
capital movement, competition, intellectual
property and public contracts with the EU.
The degree of integration sought in the
agreements with countries in the
Mediterranean is lower than is sought in the
agreements with the Balkan countries, but
higher than in those agreements concluded
with the CIS countries. The right of
establishment for credit institutions is stated
as an aim only: “the Association Councils will
make recommendations for achieving the
objective” and other legal texts are necessary
to establish a fully-fledged right. The
agreements with Israel and Lebanon are an
exception, as they immediately included rules
regarding the free establishment of financial
institutions.
EMAs are supported by the MEDA12 financial
programme, which includes financial and
technical measures “to accompany the reform
of economic and social structures in the
framework of the Euro-Mediterranean
Partnership”. During the period 1995-1999
(so-called MEDA I), the programme was worth
around d3.4 billion. For the period 2000-2006
(MEDA II), the programme is endowed with
d5.3 billion, to which a lending programme of
d7.4 billion from the European Investment
Bank should be added.
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Box 3.4
Euro-Mediterranean Agreements1





1 Cyprus, Malta and Turkey – which are also part of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership (Barcelona Process) – additionally
have the status of candidate countries. They are not therefore considered ‘ETZ’ countries as they are now part of the
accession process.
2 While the new generation of agreements (Euro-Med agreements) has not yet been ratified, the technical “Co-operation
agreements” with the EU, signed in recent decades, are still in force. Such agreements will be superseded when the new
agreements enter into force.
In the early 1960s, the then European
Economic Community entered into the first
association agreements (the Yaoundé
Agreements of 1962 and 1969) with countries
in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific. The
association agreements were repeatedly
renewed, with the Lomé Convention (Lomé I
in 1975, Lomé II in 1979, Lomé III in 1984 and
Lomé IV in 1989, with its subsequent revision).
The Cotonou agreement (2000) is the sixth
agreement in this series. Unlike other
arrangements with ‘ETZ’ regions, all Yaoundé-
Lomé-Cotonou arrangements have been
multilateral (and not bilateral) conventions.
The Cotonou Agreement states that each
participant will conclude with the EU a
bilateral “Economic Partnership Agreement”
3.4 The “Cotonou Agreement” with Sub-Saharan African countries
10 However, Cyprus, Malta and Turkey, which are part of the
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, have been attributed the
status of candidate countries separately.
11 Free trade for goods only applies to industrial goods; trade
liberalisation for agricultural goods is not foreseen in the current
agreements.
12 Mesures d’Accompagnement (accompanying measures).(EPA), which is a “new World Trade
Organisation (WTO)-compatible trading
arrangement”, with a view to “removing
progressively barriers to trade between them
and enhancing co-operation in all areas
relevant to trade”. These new (bilateral)
agreements shall be negotiated by 31
December 2007 at the latest. In April 2002 the
European Commission presented proposals to
negotiate EPAs with all partners of the
Cotonou Agreement. EPAs would combine
trade liberalisation with development policies.
The EDF13 is the financial programme for the
countries participating in the Cotonou
Agreement. The EDF – which is financed by
national contributions outside the EU budget –
has operated since the late 1950s, when the
European Economic Community was created.
In the last four decades, the EDF has extended
d42 billion and the European Investment Bank
provided d6 billion in loans to these countries.
The endowments for 2002-2005 amount to
d13.5 billion, and loans from the European
Investment Bank to d1.7 billion. According to
the Cotonou Agreement, the scope of
financing is very diverse, and may include not
only technical co-operation, but also measures
which contribute to alleviating debt burdens
and balance of payments problems and to
supporting macroeconomic and structural
reforms and policies.
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Box 3.5
Cotonou Agreement
The Cotonou Agreement has been ratified. It is a single, multilateral agreement. The 76 counterparties from
Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific include the following ‘ETZ’ countries:
Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad,
Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Republic of the Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Equatorial
Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia,
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda,
Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa1, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
1 The EU has entered into a “Trade, Development and Co-operation Agreement” with South Africa, complementing the
Cotonou Agreement.
Three features are common to all the EU
agreements with the different ‘ETZ’ regions: (i)
the agreements are part of Community Law;
(ii) they seek to extend some of the features
of the single market outside the EU; and (iii)
they create a similar institutional framework,
along the lines of some institutional features of
the EU itself.
(i) All of the above-mentioned agreements are
international treaties that legally bind EU
institutions and the EU Member States. As
stated by the European Court of Justice in
1973, and reiterated regularly since then, the
international agreements concluded under
Articles 300 and 310 EC form an integral part
of Community Law from the date they come
into force.14 The European Commission has
the task of ensuring that the agreements’
provisions are applied. While agreements
normally have to be complemented by EU
legislation, the Court of Justice has also stated
that, in particular circumstances, provisions in
agreements must be regarded as being
“directly applicable”, i.e. when they confer
rights and duties directly to companies or
individuals.15
3.5 Elements shared by all EU agreements with ‘ETZ’ countries
13 European Development Fund.
14 Cf. the Haegemann vs. Belgium case (Case 282/73).
15 Cf. the Demirel vs. Stadt Schwäbisch Gmünd case (Case
12/86).(ii) The agreements are part of a common
policy of support and integration, which the
EU conceived as a response to the need for
stability in its close neighbourhood. Stability is
always pursued along two lines: integration
and financial support.16 The agreements involve
a large number of sectors, some of which are
also immediately relevant from a monetary
perspective. Besides granting the right of free
establishment for financial institutions, several
agreements also liberalise capital movements,
either immediately (Euro-Mediterranean
Agreement with Israel) or gradually
(Stabilisation and Association Agreements).
Other agreements liberalise payments for
current account transactions in a freely
convertible currency, simply adding some rules
liberalising capital movements related to direct
investments and permitting the repatriation
of profits (e.g. other Euro-Mediterranean
Agreements). In some cases, the agreements
refer to the possibility of further liberalising
portfolio investments and commercial credits,
financial loans and credits to non-EU residents
with longer maturities (e.g. the Partnership
and Co-operation Agreement with Russia).
Several agreements commit counterparts not
to introduce new restrictions of any sort.
However, all agreements contain provisions
authorising counterparts to adopt temporary
restrictions in case of serious balance of
payments difficulties.
(iii) The agreements all establish a similar set
of common institutions: ministerial councils,
technical committees and parliamentary
committees. In some cases, they are flanked by
summits at Head-of-State level. As a rule,
these fora meet once a year.
• The summits are political events organised
at the highest level, with the participation of
the President of the European Commission,
the head of state or government holding
the EU Presidency, and the highest political
authorities of the country with which the
EU entered into an agreement.
• The ministerial councils supervise the
overall application and implementation of
the agreements, and serve as institutions for
regular political consultation. The councils
are composed of the foreign ministers and
the Commissioner for External Relations.
They also have the power to formally
adopt binding decisions or non-binding
recommendations; these legal instruments
also form an integral part of Community law.
• The committees assist the councils in
carrying out their duties, ensuring
continuity of the relationship and the
proper functioning of the meeting. They
meet at senior official level, if required
more frequently than once a year. They
are complemented by a series of
sub-committees whose compositions vary
depending on the technical expertise
required. For many years the normal
practice has been to create up to eight
or nine sub-committees, one of which
considers economic, financial and monetary
affairs.
• The parliamentary committees consist of
delegations from the European Parliament
and from the parliaments of either a single
country (e.g. Russia) or from a small group
of countries (e.g. Ukraine, Belarus and
Moldova).
In a nutshell, if all agreements were fully
implemented, the EU would be at the centre
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16 In addition to the funds mentioned in the main text, the EU
may also support balance of payments or government budgets
of a subset of ‘ETZ’ countries using exceptional measures
which are not formally contained in the agreements. This so-
called “Macro-Financial Assistance” benefits countries with
which the EU maintains “close political and economic links,
taking into account especially their geographic proximity and
the Union’s economic, commercial and political interests”.
Between 1990 and 2001 the EU earmarked f5.7 billion for
loans and grants to these countries, of which f3.3 billion was
directed to accession countries and the remainder f2.4 billion
to ‘ETZ’ countries (Albania, Algeria, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia,
Kosovo, FYR Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Ukraine, and
FR Yugoslavia). This assistance is conditional on “the existence
of a significant and commonly identified residual external
financing gap, which is based on a comprehensive and
complete quantitative assessment and transparent background
documentation, over and above the resources provided by the
IMF and other multilateral institutions and despite the
implementation of strong economic stabilisation and reform
programmes”. The assistance is released in successive tranches,
“the disbursement of each of them being conditional upon the
fulfilment of macroeconomic performance and structural
adjustment criteria”. (Text as updated at the ECOFIN Council
Meeting of 8 October 2002).of a much larger free trade area with its legal
foundation in the four sets of arrangements
(or in successor agreements still to be
negotiated). This free trade area would extend
some of the economic achievements of the EU
itself, for instance in terms of the free
establishment of credit institutions and the
free circulation of capital. It would be
underpinned by mostly bilateral institutional
arrangements, all of which, however, are based
on the implementation of Community Law and
on intense networking between EU institutions
and the respective countries’ authorities.
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agreements between the EU17 and the “Euro
Time Zone” countries are built, and
discussions on trade feature prominently in
the institutional fora established under these
agreements. Trade relations are marked by an
asymmetry in mutual trade dependency, since
the EU represents a much larger share of its
neighbours’ trade than vice versa. In fact, the
EU represents about 40% of the total external
trade of the ‘ETZ’ countries, making the EU by
far the main trading partner for most of them.
By contrast, the ‘ETZ’ countries represent
only 16.5% of total EU trade, even though they
are the main suppliers of agricultural goods,
raw materials and fuels to the EU, accounting
for more than 60% of EU imports in these
product categories.18
4 Trade relations and energy supply
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4.1.1 Trade Features
In the second half of the 1990s, one-third of
the EU’s trade with the group of less advanced
countries19 was conducted with the Western
Balkans, the European CIS, MENA and Sub-
Saharan Africa. In fact, the ‘ETZ’ countries
represent the largest EU export market and
the second largest EU import market after
Asia, making up roughly 16.5% of total EU
trade. MENA is by far the most important
region for EU trade, accounting for roughly
50% of all EU trade with ‘ETZ’ countries.
At a country level, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South
Africa and Israel are the EU’s main ‘ETZ’
trading partners. In 2000 these four countries
accounted for roughly 40% of EU trade with
the four regions, with Russia being by far the
most important of these trading partners,
representing 12% of EU exports to and 22% of
EU imports from ‘ETZ’ countries.
However, since the early 1980s, the
importance of ‘ETZ’ countries for EU trade has
declined. There are three main reasons for this:
a) The export performance of many MENA
and European CIS countries depends heavily
4.1 The EU perspective
Table 4.1
‘ETZ’ countries’ share of total EU trade
(1980-2000; in percent)
1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-2000
Exports
Western Balkans 1.9 1.9 1.4 1.2
European CIS 4.9 4.1 3.4 3.4
MENA 22.2 13.2 12.1 9.6
Sub-Saharan Africa 8.7 5.6 4.4 3.4
All ‘ETZ’ countries 37.8 24.8 21.4 17.5
Memo: Accession countries 4.0 3.7 6.6 11.4
Imports
Western Balkans 1.0 1.6 1.2 0.6
European CIS 6.5 5.1 4.2 3.9
MENA 23.1 12.0 9.9 7.6
Sub-Saharan Africa 7.7 6.7 4.8 3.5
All ‘ETZ’ countries  38.4 25.4 20.0 15.5
Memo: Accession countries 3.3 3.7 5.4 8.9
Sources: Comtrade, own calculations.
17 Given the single market status of the EU and thus the absence
of any rule of origins for EU countries, an analysis of the EU as
a whole is preferred to one for the euro area only. Hence,
trade relations are computed with all 15 countries of the EU
rather than with the 12 euro area countries.
18 If not explicitly mentioned otherwise, all figures related to EU
trade are based on extra-EU trade net of intra-EU trade.
19 Less advanced economies are defined using the IMF Direction
of Trade classification as all countries that do not belong to the
industrialised country group (i.e. the EU, the United States,
Japan, Canada, Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, Australia and
New Zealand).on the price of commodities such as oil, gas
and other raw materials, which are their
main export goods. Since MENA and the
CIS represent around 75% of total EU trade
with ‘ETZ’ countries, the share of all ‘ETZ’
countries in EU trade is correlated with
fluctuations in commodity prices, in
particular oil prices. As the prices of these
commodities have tended to decrease in
real terms for most of the 1980s and 1990s,
the share of EU trade with ‘ETZ’ countries
has declined as well.
b) Low growth and high levels of formal and
informal trade restrictions are considered
factors explaining the poor trade
performance of Africa over the last three
decades (Rodrik, 1998).20 In line with this
general trend, Sub-Saharan Africa’s share of
extra-EU trade steadily declined from 8% in
the early 1980s to 3.5% in 1995-2000.
c) Transition, financial crises and political or
military conflicts in many countries of the
European CIS and the Western Balkans
have been impediments to trade. Trade
with the Western Balkans declined
significantly in the first half of the 1990s as
a consequence of the break-up of the
Yugoslav federation and stagnated in the
second half of the decade. Exports to and
imports from the CIS were particularly hit
by the Russian financial crisis and its
negative effects in 1998/1999.
Finally, the ‘ETZ’ countries’ declining share in
EU trade can at least partly be explained by a
diversion effect linked to stronger trade
relations between the EU and the accession
countries, as these countries’ share in EU
trade rose substantially from 4% in 1990 to
around 12% in 2000.
4.1.2 Product structure
Trade between the EU and ‘ETZ’ countries is
dominated by primary goods. The share of
primary goods, i.e. food, crude materials and
fuels, is almost three times higher than in total
EU imports, although it declined from more
than 80% in the early 1980s to close to 60% in
1995-2000. In contrast, the share of
manufactured goods in EU imports from ‘ETZ’
countries has more than tripled in the same
period, as imports of low value-added
manufactured and semi-manufactured goods,
like clothing and clothing accessories,
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Chart 4.1
Share of ‘ETZ’ countries in total EU trade and oil price
Sources: Bloomberg, Comtrade, own calculations
20 Africa’s share in world trade declined from roughly 3 percent in
1980 to about 1.5% in 1999 (Subramanian, 2000).
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increased significantly.21 Accordingly, there are
signs of a very gradual convergence to the
structure of total EU imports, where
manufactured goods represent 70% of the total.
The structure of EU exports to ‘ETZ’
countries has been very stable over time. It
broadly reflects the structure of total EU
exports, which is clearly dominated by
manufactured goods which account for more
than 80% of total exports.
A detailed analysis using the Standard
Industrial Trade Classification (SITC) reveals
that the share of iron and steel and specialist
machinery for use in particular industries
experienced the most significant and broad-
based decline in EU exports to ‘ETZ’
countries. Conversely, the share of
telecommunication products and electrical
machinery in total EU exports to ‘ETZ’
countries has increased.
A comparison of EU trade structures with the
four regions reveals that product composition
changed most significantly in EU trade with the
European CIS, mainly reflecting the process of
transition in the latter economies. For
example, the share of iron and steel in EU
imports from the region more than doubled in
the 1990s, while the share of this product
group in EU exports to the CIS declined from
6.9% to 1.9%. On the other hand, the EU was
able to increase its exports of cars to the CIS
considerably (to 6.7%, up from 1.7% in 1990),
whereas exports of road vehicles from the CIS
to the EU – as a share of total exports to the
EU – declined from 2 to less than 0.2%.22
4.1.3 Contribution to trade in different
product categories
The dominance of natural resources in EU trade
with ‘ETZ’ countries becomes evident again
when calculating their market share in total EU
trade with regard to different product groups.
The EU heavily relies on the ‘ETZ’ countries for
fuels, agricultural goods and raw materials.
MENA is the major supplier of fuel products,
the European CIS provides both fuel and raw
materials, and Sub-Saharan Africa contributes
significantly to EU imports of agricultural
products. Hence, almost 40% of total EU
imports of primary goods are from ‘ETZ’
countries. However, in line with the trend
observed in the previous section, the market
share of ‘ETZ’ countries in these product
groups had declined from about 60% in the
early 1980s to less than 40% by the late 1990s.
Where exports are concerned, the analysis
shows that interestingly enough the share of
‘ETZ’ countries in EU exports is higher for
primary than for manufactured goods. This is
just the opposite of what was observed 20
years ago. From a regional point of view, this
development is mainly related to exports to
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21 For the period 1980-2000 a similar trend can be observed with
regard to total EU-imports, albeit at a different level. In 1980,
roughly 60% of EU imports were primary goods, whereas
manufactured goods represented only 40% of total EU imports.
22 For an in-depth analysis of the development of EU-Russian
trade from 1993 to 2000 see Soos, Ivleva and Levina (2002).
Chart 4.2
Structure of EU imports from
‘ETZ’ countries, 1980-2000
(in percent)




























Structure of EU exports to
‘ETZ’ countries, 1980-2000
(in percent)
Sources: Comtrade, own calculationsMENA and Sub-Saharan African countries, as
their share in EU exports of manufactured
goods dropped by roughly 60%. This is why
food is the only product category where the
‘ETZ’ countries account for more than 30% of
total EU exports.
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4.2.1 Trade Features
‘ETZ’ countries are, on average, relatively
open economies. With a trade share in GDP
of almost 70% and an export/GDP ratio of
36%, they are more exposed to trade than
developing countries in general and even more
so than high-income countries. Only the
countries of East Asia and the Pacific show a
higher degree of trade openness.
Despite the high degree of openness, in the
period 1995-2000 the ‘ETZ’ countries
accounted for only 7.3% of world exports and
6.5% of world imports. However, since
industrialised countries largely dominate world
trade with a market share close to 65%, a
comparison with the group of less advanced
countries seems more appropriate. Here, ‘ETZ’
countries rank second, as their share of the
less advanced economies’ total exports and
imports amounts to around 20%, compared
with 54% for Asia and 16% for Latin America.
Exports by ‘ETZ’ countries mainly consist of
primary commodities, although diversification
has increased considerably in the last two
decades, primarily at the expense of fuel
products. Among manufactured goods,
textiles, clothing and mechanical products are
major export items of the region. The share of
manufactured goods has quadrupled since
1980, now accounting for more than 40% of
‘ETZ’ countries’ total exports. This picture –
which applies to exports to the entire world –
does not change significantly when considering
exports to the EU only.
The structure of imports has remained
remarkably stable. Since the 1980s the shares
4.2 An ‘ETZ’ Countries’ Perspective
Table 4.2
Trade openness, 2000
(as a % of GDP)
‘ETZ’ Latin America East Asia & Developing High-income
countries & Caribbean Pacific countries countries
Exports 36.4 17.3 42.1 28.5 21.6
Trade 69.7 36.1 80.5 55.8 42.6
Sources: World Bank, own calculations.Table 4.3
Structure of ‘ETZ’ countries’ exports and imports
(1980-2000; in percent)
1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-2000
Exports Primary goods 90.7 74.0 63.4 53.4
Manufactured goods 9.1 24.7 35.6 42.5
Imports Primary goods 24.9 24.9 21.9 26.2
Manufactured goods 74.0 73.4 76.1 70.6
Sources: Comtrade, own calculations.
of primary and manufactured goods have been
fluctuating at around 25% and 75%
respectively. The structure is somewhat less
diversified if one considers imports from the
EU only, where manufactured goods have an
even larger share.
The composition of trade varies across the
four regions, as the Western Balkans have a
rather untypical trade structure. Manufactured
goods, not primary goods, are their main
export item, in particular textiles and
transport equipment. Hence the structure of
trade for the Western Balkan countries
resembles more that of the European Union
than that of the other three regions
considered in this paper.
This is because the export structure of the
European CIS, MENA and Sub-Saharan Africa
is dominated by primary goods. Fuel products
alone account for 36-40% of the total exports
of these three regions. Since the countries of
Sub-Saharan Africa are also the main
exporters of food and raw materials, the share
of primary goods in total Sub-Saharan African
exports amounts to 65%.
Turning to the structure of imports,
manufactured goods account for 70% of total
imports to the Balkans, MENA and Sub-
Saharan Africa. Only the CIS has a significantly
lower share as a result of stronger import
demand for food and fuel products, largely
reflecting intra-CIS trade because energy
resources are unevenly distributed within the
region.
4.2.2 The role of the EU
The EU is by far the largest trading partner of
most ‘ETZ’ countries. The EU absorbs 36% of
their total exports and provides 42% of their
imports.23 However, over the last two decades
the EU has lost market share, in particular
with regard to exports and imports to and
from Sub-Saharan Africa.
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Table 4.4
Structure of exports and imports for the ‘ETZ’ countries and the four regions1)
(1995-2000; in percent)
Sub-Saharan All ‘ETZ’
Balkans2) CIS MENA Africa countries
Exports Primary goods 25.4 50.2 50.0 65.3 53.4
Manufactured goods 73.1 42.5 49.7 30.8 42.5
Imports Primary goods 27.3 38.3 23.1 25.9 26.2
Manufactured goods 68.2 56.0 75.1 71.1 70.6
Sources: Comtrade, own calculations.
1) Including intra-regional trade.
2) 1995-1999.
23 The importance of the EU as an export market for many ’ETZ’
countries is also stressed by Barro (2001). In the Western Balkans, dependency on the EU
is particularly high. More than half of external
trade is conducted with the EU. Meanwhile,
with less than 30%, the European CIS countries
exhibit the lowest EU trade share among the
four regions considered, primarily because of
substantial intra-CIS trade. Among the group of
advanced countries, the EU is the largest
trading partner of the European CIS.
While the share of EU imports in total MENA
imports has been fairly stable over the last 20
years, the fluctuations of the market share of
MENA exports to the EU clearly reflects
changes in the price of oil and other
commodities. EU trade links are particularly
strong with the Mediterranean countries,
especially those of the Maghreb, while
transactions with the Arab Peninsula are more
limited. Although EU export and import shares
in total trade have declined since the late
1980s, the EU is still the most important
trading partner for most Sub-Saharan African
countries. Within the region, the EU accounts
for roughly 40% of the CFA franc zone
countries’ exports and more than 45% of their
imports. Moreover, the bulk of the trade
(about one-third) of the two most important
countries in the region – South Africa and
Nigeria – is done with the EU.
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Table 4.5
The share of the EU in ‘ETZ’ countries’ trade
(1980-2000; in percent)
1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-2000
Exports
Western Balkans1) 54.6 41.5 54.1 47.5
European CIS n.a. n.a. n.a. 27.5
MENA 43.8 48.7 33.2 39.0
Sub-Saharan Africa 49.9 54.8 41.9 36.7
All ‘ETZ’ countries 45.2 50.2 35.3 36.4
Imports
Western Balkans1) 59.2 44.9 52.4 53.8
European CIS n.a. n.a. n.a. 28.3
MENA 46.6 46.6 45.5 43.8
Sub-Saharan Africa 52.8 58.0 48.1 42.3
All ‘ETZ’ countries 48.7 49.2 45.0 41.6
Sources: Comtrade, own calculations.
1) 1981-84, 1988-89, 1992-94, 1995-2000
Regional integration among ‘ETZ’ countries is
underdeveloped, as intra-regional trade
accounts for just 18% of the total trade of the
‘ETZ’ countries.24 The remarkable exception is
the European CIS, which has an intra-regional
trade share of 33%.
Political conflicts, high tariffs, a legacy of
central planning or inward-oriented policies
based on import substitution and self-
sufficiency, differences in economic strategies
within the sub-regions (i.e. countries following
market-oriented policies and countries relying
on a high degree of government involvement),
similar factor endowments and production
structures are major reasons explaining the
lack of regional integration. Trade relations
between the four regions are even less
developed. The only really significant trade
relations are between the Western Balkans
and the CIS, and between Sub-Saharan Africa
and the MENA countries.
In the Western Balkans civil war, ethnic
conflicts, a variety of trade restrictions, weak
capacity in trade-related institutions and a
re-orientation towards the European Union
4.3 Regional integration
24 For the sake of comparison, regional trade among the ASEAN
countries and among the Mercosur countries was 21% each in
1995 (Jadresic, 2000).strongly hampered intra-regional trade in the
1990s. However, the legacy of economic
relations in the former Yugoslavia was strong
enough to ensure that intra-regional trade in
the Balkans is still higher than in MENA or
Sub-Saharan Africa. In recent years, a number
of bilateral free trade agreements have been
negotiated to promote trade between the
countries of the region. However, the
patchwork of agreements and implementation
practices seemed to have increased the
complexity and the level of distortion of trade
rather than reducing it (World Bank, 2001).25
The European CIS exhibits a very high level of
integration, with intra-CIS exports accounting
for 30% of total exports and intra-CIS imports
representing 36% of total imports. Strong ties
with Russia, that still partly reflect the
economic legacy of the former Soviet Union,26
dominate intra-CIS trade, with Russia
accounting for about one-half of all intra-
regional trade. Trade relations are, however,
asymmetric. While less than one-fifth of
Russia’s trade is conducted with European CIS
countries, one-third of the latter’s total trade
is with Russia. Even stronger integration is
hampered by recurrent disputes over energy
supplies and by a patchwork of bilateral and
multilateral trade arrangements between CIS
countries.27
Intra-regional trade among the MENA
countries accounts on average for 8.5% of
overall trade. Political conflicts, high tariffs,
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Table 4.6
Intra-regional trade among ‘ETZ’ countries and regions:
share of exports 
(as a % of total exports, average 1995-2000)
Western Sub-Saharan
Balkans CIS MENA Africa ‘ETZ’ EU
Western Balkans1) 19.1 4.1 1.6 2.9 27.7 47.5
CIS 0.4 30.3 2.5 0.3 33.5 27.5
MENA 0.2 1.1 10.1 1.1 12.5 39.0
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.0 0.4 2.9 14.9 18.2 36.7
All ‘ETZ’ countries 18.5 36.4
EU 1.2 3.4 9.6 3.4 17.5 59.6
Sources: Comtrade, own calculations
1) 1995-1999
Table 4.7
Intra-regional trade: share of imports 
(as a % of total exports, average 1995-2000)
Western Sub-Saharan All ‘ETZ’
Balkans CIS MENA Africa countries EU
Western Balkans1) 5.6 6.2 3.4 0.5 15.7 53.8
CIS 0.4 36.6 1.3 0.5 38.8 28.3
MENA 0.1 2.5 7.4 1.3 11.3 43.8
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.0 0.7 6.1 9.9 16.7 42.3
All ‘ETZ’ countries 17.2 41.6
EU 0.6 3.9 7.6 3.5 15.5 57.5
Sources: Comtrade, own calculations.
1) 1995-1999
25 In June 2001, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria,
Croatia, FYR Macedonia, Romania and FR Yugoslavia signed a
Memorandum of Understanding on Trade Liberalisation and
Facilitation. Its major goal is to establish a network of Free
Trade Agreements in the region.
26 Intra-CIS trade has declined steadily since the collapse of the
Soviet Union (Havrylyshyn and Al-Atrash, 1998). However,
according to Fidrmuc and Fidrmuc (2000) trade relations
between Russia, Belarus and Ukraine are still much more
intensive than a standard gravity model of trade would predict. 
27 See ECE (2001).contradictory economic policy strategies
among the countries involved, differences in
per capita incomes, and a similar factor
endowment are strong barriers in this
respect.28
The situation is broadly similar in Sub-Saharan
Africa. Despite being characterised by a large
number of trade agreements29, the region
shows low levels of integration to date, with
just 12.5% of trade being conducted within the
area.30 South Africa, the most developed
country in the region, exports only around
12% of its goods and services to other sub-
Saharan countries, and imports from the
region are even lower at 3%.
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‘ETZ’ countries are crucial with regard to
world energy supply. Currently, 50% of oil and
40% of natural gas production come from
three ‘ETZ’ regions: MENA, CIS and Sub-
Saharan Africa. Their importance will even
increase in the future, as 80% of all proven oil
and gas reserves are concentrated in these
regions. Some estimates state that in 2020
some 40% of the world’s oil production will
come just from the Persian Gulf (at present
roughly 30%). The bulk of reserves,
particularly oil, are located in the Middle East,
with Saudi Arabia alone accounting for 25% of
proven reserves. Where natural gas is
concerned, Russia, too, plays a major role, and
the Caspian Sea reserves are not negligible
either.
In contrast, reserves in the major oil and gas
consuming regions, North America and
Europe, are significantly below their present
share of production. For the euro area, it is
worth noting that the UK and Norway only
command small reserves. In the medium term
their share in Europe’s energy supply is likely
to decrease and will have to be replaced by
other sources, with estimates indicating that
North Sea oil reserves will be exhausted
within 25 years if production continues at its
present rate. This is why, according to EU
Commission estimates, the EU’s dependence
on oil imports, which is already high at 75% of
its oil supplies in 2000, is likely to increase
further and exceed 85% in 2020.31
These data highlight the importance of these
regions for Europe with regard to energy
supply. Political and economic developments in
countries commanding large reserves of oil
and gas could thus increasingly have a crucial
impact on world energy prices going beyond
the influence they already have today. It is
worth noting in this context that the major
recessions in the industrialised world in the
last three decades have been related to oil
price hikes, which in turn were closely linked
to political events in the Middle East: the Yom
Kippur war in 1973, the Iranian revolution in
1979 and the Gulf war in 1991. Moreover,
price developments in the euro area are
influenced considerably by oil price
movements, although to a lesser extent than
in the 1970s (ECB, 2000), as energy-source
diversification has led to a decline in the
contribution of oil to Europe’s primary energy
consumption. A continuation of this process
could further reduce the significance of oil
prices for the euro area economy in the
future, but this process will be slow, and any
forecast regarding its path of development is
surrounded by great uncertainty insofar as 
it will be dependent upon technical progress 
in (i) the exploitation of alternative energy
sources, (ii) the more efficient use of oil, and
(iii) political decisions, e.g. concerning the use
of nuclear, solar, wind and hydrodynamic
power.
4.4 ‘ETZ’ countries as major energy suppliers
28 Using a gravity model, Al-Atrash and Yousef (2000) find that
intra-Arab trade is lower than what would be predicted given
the size of economies involved and the distances between
them. 
29 For details, see Subramanian (2000), and section 2.2.4.
30 A substantial number of African countries do not have trading
relationships with other African countries. Trade within
Anglophone Africa (Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius,
Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and
Zimbabwe) has shown signs of dynamism over the last decade
(Subramanian and Tamirisa, 2001). 
31 For a detailed analysis of medium- and long-term oil market
developments and a proposed EU strategy see European
Commission (2000).Table 4.8
The role of ‘ETZ’ countries in oil and gas supply
(Data for end-2000; reserves = proven reserves; as a percentage of the world total)
Oil Natural Gas
Region Production Reserves Production Reserves
MENA 36.1 69.3 13.3 39.6
Russia + other CIS1) 11.0 6.4 27.8 37.8
Sub-Saharan Africa 5.3 3.1 0.7 2.8
All ‘ETZ’ countries 52.4 78.8 41.8 80.2
Memorandum:
Europe 9.2 1.9 12.0 3.5
North America2) 18.1 6.1 31.3 4.9
South/Central America 9.7 9.0 3.9 4.6
Asia/Pacific 10.6 4.2 11.0 6.8
Sources: BP (2002), own calculations.
1) Including Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.
2) Including Mexico.
The importance for world energy supply is
mirrored by the oil export dependency of
many ‘ETZ’ countries. This reveals the lack of
diversification in their economies, which makes
them dependent on oil price movements.
The oil price increase in 1999 and 2000 and
its implications for the euro area economy
have led to political initiatives at the EU
level to intensify contacts with the major
energy-supplying countries. The European
Commission has suggested setting up an
ongoing dialogue on oil market developments
with OPEC and its principal member states –
most of which are ‘ETZ’ countries – with the
aim of achieving stable prices. In addition,
energy-related issues are likely to play an
increasing role in EU relations with Russia. At
the EU-Russia summit in October 2000 the
two sides agreed to develop an “EU-Russia
energy partnership”. As oil price volatility has
a negative impact on both the major oil
producer and consumer countries, measures
to stabilise oil prices and to smooth volatility
would be in the interest of both sides,
whereas agreement on an appropriate level of
oil prices is more difficult to achieve. OPEC
plays a particularly significant role in influencing
world prices, although it currently accounts
for only about 40% of world oil production.
This is mainly due to its spare capacity for oil
production. While non-OPEC producers more
or less fully exploit their production capacity,
several OPEC producers, in particular Saudi
Arabia, have sufficient spare capacity to
increase production even in the short run in
the event of increasing demand or a shortfall
of supply from other countries.
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Table 4.9
Oil export dependency of ‘ETZ’ countries
Net oil exports as a percentage of total exports1) Countries
> 90 Nigeria, Libya, Oman
80-89 Angola, Yemen, Kuwait, Rep. of the Congo, Saudi Arabia
70-79 Iran, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea
60-69 Syria, Algeria, Qatar
40-49 United Arab Emirates
30-39 Cameroon
20-29 Bahrain, Russia
Sources: IMF WEO October 2000.
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Box 4.1
The impact of oil dependency: the case of the member countries of the
Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC)
Six countries on the Arabian Peninsula – Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E. –
form the Gulf Co-operation Council. The GCC countries account for 20% of world oil production and 45%
of proven world oil reserves. All GCC countries except Bahrain and Oman are OPEC members. Oil
production has lifted the level of economic development and living standards enormously in recent decades.
The GCC countries changed from being essentially subsistence economies in 1970 to extremely wealthy
countries as early as in 1980. With a GDP per capita of about USD 28,000 and USD 26,000 respectively,
Qatar and the U.A.E. are among the wealthiest countries in the world.
However, the dominance of the oil sector as the driving force in the economy also makes GCC countries
extremely dependent on oil price developments. On average the oil sector contributes roughly one-third to
GCC GDP, roughly two-thirds of government revenues are oil revenues, and oil exports account for
approximately 80% of total GCC exports.
Oil dependency of GCC countries
(Data for 1998)
Share of oil in: Oman Kuwait S. Arabia Qatar U.A.E. Bahrain
GDP1) 30.5 38.7 29.6 35.9 20.7 13.4
Gov. revenue2) 71.4 60.0 65.3 59.0 67.3 47.0
Exports3) 87.7 88.1 84.1 79.0 38.2 54.0
Overall oil
dependency4) 189.6 186.8 179.0 173.9 126.3 114.4
Source: IMF.
1) Oil and gas sector’s share of GDP.
2) Oil and gas revenue/total government revenue including grants and investment income.
3) Oil and oil products’ share of total exports.
4) The sum of the oil shares in GDP, government revenue and total exports is taken here as an indicator of the country’s overall
oil dependency. 
The heavy dependence of government finances on oil revenues reflects the weak fiscal basis of GCC
countries, where, for example, there is no such thing as personal income tax or a general consumption tax
(like VAT). The high proportion of oil in GCC countries’ overall exports leads to a translation of oil price
volatility into trade volatility and into the volatility of current account balances and government budget
balances.
Governments in all GCC countries have identified diversification as one of the major challenges for their
economies and declared the reduction of their oil dependency as a key economic policy priority. They have
realised that neither the public sector nor the oil industry alone will provide sufficient job opportunities for
their young and growing populations. The development of the private non-oil sector is thus seen as crucial
to ease the increasing labour market pressure. The need for diversification is particularly strong in countries
like Bahrain and Oman, whose oil reserves are limited and are expected to run out in about 20-25 years. In
contrast, the oil reserves of Saudi Arabia, the U.A.E and Kuwait will not be depleted for a much longer
period at present levels of production. As regards the diversification of their economies, progress among the
GCC countries is slow, with Bahrain and the U.A.E. having achieved the most tangible results so far.
Bahrain has established itself as a financial hub for the Gulf region and beyond for the Arab world –
particularly in Islamic banking – and is, together with the U.A.E., the least oil-dependent country of the
GCC. Tourism, transport and the related services are other areas where Bahrain and the U.A.E. are trying to
gain ground. The exploration of natural gas resources is seen as another important source of diversification
upon which Saudi Arabia and Qatar have pinned much of their hopes (Qatar has the third largest gasECB • Occasional Paper Series No. 7 • December 2002 34
Box 4.1 (continued)
Implied effects of oil price movements for the GCC
Sources: IMF WEO
1) Projection.
reserves in the world). It should be borne in mind, however, that a switch from oil to gas as the major source
of export revenues would not solve the problems of the Gulf countries, which are instead related to their
role as primary commodity exporters. They would still face the consequences of price volatility, particularly
as natural gas prices tend to fluctuate in line with oil prices.
Government budget balance (left-hand scale)
Current account balance (left-hand scale)














1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 20021)Financial linkages are an important factor of
integration in the world economy. However,
international financial linkages can only be
developed if domestic financial systems are
sound and efficient (IMF, 2001). With a few
exceptions, the financial sectors of the ‘ETZ’
countries are small, underdeveloped and
fragile. Accordingly, it comes as no surprise
that their degree of financial integration with
the world economy is rather low.
Bank lending and official development
assistance funds provided by multilateral and
bilateral creditors account for 70% of ‘ETZ’
countries’ debt, with the euro area being the
main source of financing. The ‘ETZ’ countries
lead the way among the group of developing
countries for euro area bank claims and are
the largest recipients of official aid provided by
the EU. With regard to FDI and portfolio
flows, obstacles to foreign involvement in
most countries are so large that their amount,
even compared to other developing countries,
is rather low from a euro area perspective.
However, FDI flows have increased over the
last decade, with euro area companies being
the largest direct investors.
There are clear differences between the four
regions. In the Western Balkans, links to the
euro area are the tightest, not only with
regard to financial instruments and the
currency denomination of most of these
instruments, but also in terms of direct
involvement of euro area banks in domestic
financial markets. There are also strong
financial links with the CIS, with euro area
banks being the region’s major creditor. In
general, resource-rich countries are the main
targets of EU companies and banks, not only in
the CIS but also in MENA and Sub-Saharan
Africa. In the latter two regions, the financial
linkages to the euro area are strong, but not
as dominating as in the Western Balkans and
to a lesser extent the CIS.
5    Financial linkages
ECB • Occasional Paper Series No. 7 • December 2002 35
With a few exceptions, notably some MENA
countries and South Africa, financial sectors are
small, with most of their activity concentrated
in the banking sector. Capital markets are
either non-existent or underdeveloped, with
low levels of trading, low liquidity and very few
listed companies.32 However, banks do not
underpin economic growth either, as many of
the following characteristics can be observed in
several countries:33
• a dominant role of the state, which owns a
large portion of banks’ capital;
• insufficient capitalisation, with many banks
having a capital adequacy ratio below 8%;
• instruments of “financial repression”, like
privileged access to funds for some sectors
of the economy;
• private banks operating as pocket or agent
banks, i.e. mainly serving as financial arms of
their owners;
• a very limited role of foreign banks, with
the exception of the Western Balkans;
• a lack of risk-based credit allocation and of
competition between banks, resulting in a
high share of non-performing loans;
• large spreads between lending and deposit
rates;
• weak banking supervision and regulation
(although there has been a tendency toward
5.1 Domestic financial sectors
32 In its World Development Report the World Bank (2000) listed
only 21 ‘ETZ’ countries with active stock markets. These
countries were: Armenia, Botswana, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia,
Egypt, Ghana, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon,
Morocco, Namibia, Nigeria, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa,
Tunisia, Zambia, Zimbabwe. The total market capitalisation in
1998 was USD 380 billion, which at that time amounted to
46% of the stock market capitalisation in Germany. South
Africa had by far the largest stock market, accounting for
almost half of the total stock market capitalisation in ‘ETZ’
countries.
33 The following summary of the evidence is based on Gelbhard
and Leite (1999); Le Gall and Nsouli (2001); the World Bank
(1989, 1993, 2002); EBRD (1998); and Winkler (2002). Chart 5.1
Financial depth of ‘ETZ’ countries1)
(M2/GDP, in percent)
Sources: IFS, IMF country reports, own calculations
1) 2000, or latest available data
Table 5.1
Selected financial indicators in ‘ETZ’ countries 
(unweighted averages, 2000; in percent)
Western Sub-Saharan All  ‘ETZ’ Memo:
Balkans CIS MENA Africa countries Euro Area
M2/GDP1) 32.2 17.1 63.8 2) 30.7 3) 35.9 66.7
Domestic Credit/GDP 36.5 4) 18.7 78.7 5) 26.0 6) 40.0 134.5
Currency/M1 48.9 66.1 42.7 7) 42.2 8) 50.0 18.8
Sources: IMF, World Bank, own calculations.
1) Also includes data for 1998 and 1999 when 2000 is not available.
2) Excluding Iraq, Lebanon and the Palestinian Territories.
3) Excluding Democratic Republic of the Congo, The Gambia, Mayotte, São Tomé & Príncipe, Sierra Leone and Somalia.
4) Excluding Bosnia and Herzegovina and FR Yugoslavia.
5) Excluding Iraq, Israel, Libya, Oman, U.A.E. and the Palestinian Territories.
6) Excluding Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Gabon, the Gambia, Guinea
Bissau, Liberia, Mauritius, Mayotte, Namibia, São Tomé & Príncipe, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan and Swaziland.
7) Excluding Iraq and the Palestinian Territories.
8) Excluding Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mayotte and Somalia.
greater compliance with the Basel core
principles);
• accounting, auditing and corporate
governance lacking transparency and
accountability;
• and an underdeveloped judicial and legal
enforcement of collateral rights.
These structural weaknesses are reflected in
low indicators of financial development, such
as the ratio of liquid liabilities (M2) to GDP,
the ratio of domestic credit to GDP and the
ratio of currency in circulation to M1.
Country-specific analysis reveals that only
MENA countries, South Africa and the island
states of Mauritius and Seychelles have
financial systems whose financial depth, as
measured by the M2/GDP ratio, is comparable
to that of the euro area.
Financial intermediation in ‘ETZ’ countries is
also underdeveloped. The amount of credit to
the economy is particularly low in the CIS,



















European CISSub-Saharan Africa and the Western Balkans,
whereas in MENA countries credit is in much
more ample supply. However, since many
MENA countries shield domestic enterprises
from the competitive pressures of globalisation
(World Bank, 2002), the high level of credit
has to be interpreted with caution. On an
aggregate level, domestic credit to GDP for all
‘ETZ’ countries is on average less than one-
third of the ratio for the euro area.
Finally, many ‘ETZ’ countries are still fairly
cash-based economies and exhibit a relatively
high currency-to-M1 ratio, reaching values of
more than 70% in some CIS countries. Even in
MENA countries, the share of currency in
circulation in M1 is more than twice as high as
in the euro area.
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Box 5.1
Euro area banks in the Western Balkans
Over the last decade, some regions, notably Latin America and the EU accession countries, have
experienced a strong increase in foreign bank presence in the domestic banking markets (IMF 2000a;
Clarke, Cull, Peria and Sánchez, 2001; Buch 2002). In most ‘ETZ’ countries such developments have been
more subdued, with the exception of the Western Balkans where euro area financial institutions have
invested heavily. In Croatia, for example, banks with a majority of foreign owners hold more than 80% of
total assets (CEC, 2002). The Albanian private banking sector is completely in foreign hands, with banks
from Greece and Italy being major investors. Euro area banks have been key players in the reconstruction
and privatisation of the banking sector of Bosnia and Herzegovina (IMF, 2001b). Even in Serbia, it was the
banking sector that saw the fastest reaction from foreign investors (all of them euro area banks) in response
to the opening up that occurred when the new reform-oriented government took office in 2001.
The strong presence of euro area banks and financial institutions in the Western Balkans is attributable to
three main factors:
• Banks followed the non-financial firms of their home countries that were already active in the region.
Since these companies are mainly from the euro area, for historical reasons and because of geographical
proximity, euro area banks are the major investors in the Western Balkans.
• Local authorities actively encouraged a foreign presence in their domestic markets when they discovered
the need to restructure and privatise their banking systems.
• Progress in monetary stabilisation and the strong role of the euro in the exchange rate regime and/or as
a deposit currency has lowered risk and facilitated entry by euro area banks and financial institutions.
5.2.1 International capital flows to ‘ETZ’
countries: an overview
With some exceptions, ‘ETZ’ countries have
not been among the main recipients of
international capital flows, namely bank loans,
portfolio flows or foreign direct investment.34
Rather, the bulk of the increasing capital flows
to emerging markets in the 1990s has been
directed to East Asia and Latin America.35
Clearly, many ‘ETZ’ countries have not been
affected by the recent trend of financial
globalisation. In particular Sub-Saharan Africa
has been largely spared (Calvo and Reinhart,
1998; Calvo 2001). There are at least four
reasons for this:
5.2 International financial linkages: debt structure
34 It is worth recalling that most international capital flows remain
within the group of developed countries (IMF, 2001d).
35 In any case, there is a heavy concentration of flows, with six
developing countries accounting for 75% and 70% of total
portfolio and FDI flows respectively in the period 1970 – 2000
(IMF, 2000a). South Africa is the only ‘ETZ’ country on this list,
being the fifth largest recipient of portfolio flows in this period.Table 5.2
External debt of ‘ETZ’ countries
Total debt (in USD  Percentage of total  Total debt (as a % of
billions, 2000) ‘ETZ’ debt (2000) GDP, 1999)1)
Western Balkans 14.8 3.1 34.82)
CIS 110.6 23.1 36.6
MENA 193.3 40.4 26.83)
Sub-Saharan Africa 159.5 33.4 51.6
All ‘ETZ’ countries 478.2 100.0 34.14)
Sources: BIS, IMF, World Bank, own calculations.
1) Unweighted averages.
2) Excluding FR Yugoslavia. 
3) Excluding Bahrain, Iraq, Lebanon and the Palestinian Territories.
4) Excluding Bahrain, Iraq, Lebanon, the Palestinian Territories and FR Yugoslavia. 
• The weak institutional framework of most
domestic financial sectors highlighted in
the previous section. Portfolio equity
investment, for example, is strongly linked
to the degree of financial development in
the recipient countries (Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti, 2000).
• Most ‘ETZ’ countries have maintained a
rather restrictive regulatory framework
where capital account transactions are
concerned.36 Of course, in comparison to
the status quo of the early 1990s, the
recent liberalisation record of the transition
countries in the Western Balkans and the
European CIS has been quite impressive. In
the mid-1990s Russia liberalised capital
account transactions almost completely, but
then reintroduced controls after the 1998
financial crisis.37 Besides Israel, which is in
the process of completing the process of
full capital account liberalisation,
liberalisation in MENA is most advanced in
the GCC countries and Lebanon (Sugisaki,
1998). In general, however, progress has
been small in comparison to other regions
(Nashashibi, Elhage and Shabsigh, 2001).
Finally, in Sub-Saharan Africa only a small
group of countries have a high degree of
capital account openness, although it has to
be noted that, in practice, the CFA franc
region has a high degree of capital account
mobility thanks to its openness to France
(Gall and Nsouli, 2001).
• Many ‘ETZ’ countries are not creditworthy
as a result of their over-indebtedness, poor
economic performance and war-related
instability. Yemen and 34 African countries
are part of the HIPC initiative,38 while in the
European CIS Armenia, Moldova and
Georgia face almost unsustainable debt
burdens (IMF, 2001a). Some of the
countries of the Western Balkans are just
starting to regain possible financial partner
status. Accordingly, these countries, except
Croatia, have to rely almost exclusively on
official flows and have been excluded from
the surge of capital flows in the last decade.
• Capital flows to the oil-producing countries
of the MENA region are rather sensitive to
developments in world oil markets.
At the end of 2000, the outstanding external
debt of the ‘ETZ’ countries amounted to USD
475 billion, with MENA countries absorbing
40% of total borrowing, Sub-Saharan Africa
33% and the CIS countries 23%. Ten countries
accounted for 60% of the total debt, with
Russia being by far the largest ‘ETZ’ debtor
country (20% share). In terms of GDP, total
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36 Measuring the degree of capital account liberalisation is difficult
because it requires the quantification of the scope and
effectiveness of capital controls. Several indicators have been
developed and the results seem to indicate that the
liberalisation drive in the 1990s was rather limited in most
‘ETZ’ countries (IMF, 2001d). In addition, it is noteworthy that,
at the end of 2000, of the 34 IMF member states applying
Article XIV – temporarily discharging member states from their
obligation to avoid any restrictions on current payments – 23 of
them were ‘ETZ’ countries (IMF, 2001d). 
37 For details see IMF (1999, Annex 3). 
38 HIPC stands for “Heavily Indebted Poor Countries”: the
respective initiatives of the IMF and the World Bank seek to
address the debt problems of the poorest and most heavily
indebted countries. Of the 42 HIPC countries, 35 are ‘ETZ’
countries.Table 5.3
Structure of external debt of ‘ETZ’ countries
(December 2000; end of period, as a % of total stocks)
Debt   Non-bank  Multi-  Official 
Bank securities Brady trade lateral bilateral 
loans issued abroad bonds credits claims loans
Western Balkans 26.7 23.5 0.0 18.1 26.2 5.5
European CIS 30.6 16.7 0.0 25.5 24.5 2.6
MENA 56.1 8.2 0.2 18.3 6.6 10.7
Sub-Saharan Africa 29.4 6.3 2.3 18.1 31.1 12.8
All ‘ETZ’ countries 40.7 9.7 0.9 19.7 19.4 9.6
Sources: BIS and IMF, own calculations.
‘ETZ’ countries’ debt stands at 34%, with Sub-
Saharan Africa being the region with the
highest level of debt.39
Bank loans are the dominant form of external
financing, followed by multilateral and bilateral
claims and loans. Non-bank trade credits
represent almost 20% of total debt, whereas
external financing via debt securities accounts
for only 10% of total borrowing. ‘ETZ’
countries finance themselves on a rather long-
term basis, with only 20% of total debt being
due within one year.
Although bank loans are predominant in the
external debt structure, closer inspection
reveals that this stems largely from the
situation in the MENA countries. Indeed, 56%
of total MENA debt is financed by bank loans
whereas in the other regions bank loans
represent less than one-third of total external
financing. The debt structure of MENA
countries is also very different with regard to
the share of official claims of multilateral and
bilateral creditors: only 17% of MENA debt is
in the hands of official creditors, whereas the
CIS and the Western Balkans financed around
30% of their debt via official channels, and Sub-
Saharan Africa as much as 43%.
Non-bank trade credits account for a similar
share, around 20%, of the external financing of
all regions. Strong regional differences again
emerge when analysing the share of external
debt financed by issuing securities abroad.
Whereas Western Balkan countries – notably
Croatia – are able to finance more than 23%
of their debt by issuing securities abroad, this
form of financing represents only 6% of total
Sub-Saharan Africa debt.
5.2.2 International bank lending
‘ETZ’ countries account for only 3% of
international bank claims worldwide. However,
given the industrialised countries’ predominance
in international capital markets,40 it is more
appropriate to restrict comparisons to the group
of developing countries. Within this group, ‘ETZ’
countries rank third behind Asia and Latin
America, being debtors in roughly 24% of
consolidated bank claims of BIS reporting banks.
Whereas the share of ‘ETZ’ countries in total
bank lending to developing countries has
exhibited a remarkable degree of stability over
the last 15 years, the relative importance of
the four regions has changed significantly. In
the 1990s, CIS countries became the second
largest borrower in the region, while MENA
and Sub-Saharan countries lost ground. On a
country-by-country basis there is a high
degree of concentration, with more than 70%
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39 The most highly indebted countries in Sub-Saharan Africa are
São Tomé & Príncipe with a debt-to-GDP ratio of 507%,
Guinea-Bisseau (423%) and Somalia (282%). Among the
MENA countries, Syria has a debt-to-GDP ratio of 136%,
whereas in the CIS Molodva (73%) and Georgia (57%) are
examples of highly indebted countries. At the other extreme,
Botswana has a debt-to-GDP ratio of 9% and Belarus of only
3%.
40 Developed countries, including offshore centres, represent
almost 90% of total BIS and total euro area BIS reporting
banks’ claims because the BIS statistics include claims on BIS
reporting countries themselves. of total claims being accounted for by 15 of
the 81 ‘ETZ’ countries.41
As in other regions of the developing world,
the share of short-term bank loans has
decreased significantly since the Asian financial
crisis.42 In 2000, 47% of bank loans to ‘ETZ’
countries had a maturity of up to and including
one year. Among the major borrowers only
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and the
U.A.E. had more than 60% of their liabilities
with a short-term maturity.
– The euro area perspective
‘ETZ’ countries are major borrowers of euro
area banks, accounting for 32% of euro area
banks’ claims on developing countries.
Accordingly, Latin America and Asia, the
largest debtors among developing countries
worldwide, rank behind ‘ETZ’ countries with
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Table 5.4
Consolidated international claims of BIS reporting banks
(as a percent of claims to developing countries)
Sub- Memo:
Western Saharan All ‘ETZ’ Memo: Latin
Balkans CIS MENA Africa countries Asia America
1985-1989 1.8 0.0 13.5 8.8 24.1 20.0 42.4
1990-1994 0.9 2.1 12.8 7.4 23.2 30.4 32.8
1995-2000 1.2 6.4 10.0 5.9 23.7 38.5 30.2
Sources: BIS, own calculations.
Chart 5.2
Share of ‘ETZ’ countries in euro area banks’ claims1)
(in percent)
Sources: BIS, own calculations.























41 These countries are: Croatia, Russia, Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Israel,
Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, U.A.E,
Kenya and South Africa. 
42 For details see Dadush, Dasgupta and Ratha (2000).respective shares of 29% and 27%. In 2000 the
outstanding portfolio of euro area banks
amounted to roughly USD 137 billion. Russia
is by far the largest debtor of euro area banks,
accounting for roughly 22% of total claims.
South Africa, Iran and Croatia are also major
debtors, with more than USD 6 billion
outstanding debt.
A reorientation of euro area financial flows
towards the Balkans and the European CIS and
away from MENA and Sub-Saharan Africa
countries is a recent noteworthy trend.
Despite increasing slightly in absolute amounts,
the shares of MENA and Sub-Saharan Africa
have declined significantly since 1985, whereas
loans to the CIS increased to more than one-
third of total lending to ‘ETZ’ countries. Wars
in the Western Balkans left their mark on the
international banking statistics as well, with
euro area bank lending to the region decreasing
by more 30% from 1985 to 1993. Since then,
however, the exposure of euro area banks to
the Balkan area has expanded by more than
700%, to almost USD 18 billion in 2000.
Claims on the Western Balkans are
predominantly denominated in euro, and more
than 37% of total claims on the CIS are euro-
based. On an aggregate level, however,
outstanding claims by BIS reporting banks to
‘ETZ’ countries are mainly denominated in USD,
whereas only 25% of total claims are
denominated in euro.43 The share of euro-
denominated lending rises when only claims by
euro area banks are considered: 42% of total
euro area banks’ claims are denominated in euro.
– The ‘ETZ’ countries perspective
‘ETZ’ countries are highly dependent on
international bank lending by euro area banks,
as these banks account for 67% of total claims.
Euro area banks clearly dominate the market
in the Western Balkans and the CIS, and are
also the main lenders to MENA and Sub-
Saharan Africa.
In the Western Balkans, financial efforts to
reintegrate the region into the world economy
have mainly been driven by European
institutions. The same holds true for the CIS.
Over the last 15 years, euro area banks have
also become the dominant source of financing
in Sub-Saharan Africa, accounting for roughly
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Chart 5.3
Share of euro-denominated bank claims on ‘ETZ’ countries
(in percent)
Sources: BIS, own calculations.




















Total BIS reporting banks
Euro area reporting banks
43 The share of euro-denominated claims on ‘ETZ’ countries
(24.9%) is slightly higher than the share of euro-denominated
claims on developing countries in general (16.7%).Table 5.5
Share of euro area banks’ claims on ‘ETZ’ countries
(in percent)
Western European Sub-Saharan All ‘ETZ’
Year Balkans CIS MENA Africa countries
1985-1989 44.2 – 51.5 45.7 48.9
1990-1994 58.7 87.1 57.4 54.2 59.9
1995-2000 81.6 85.0 57.9 58.3 66.8
Sources: BIS, own calculations
60% of total international borrowing. With
regard to MENA it is noteworthy that there
are major differences within the region:
whereas international bank claims on
Northern Africa are mostly (75%) held by
euro area banks, only 25% of those claims on
the Middle East are in the portfolios of euro
area banks.
5.2.3 Bond markets
At the end of 2000 total outstanding debt
securities of ‘ETZ’ countries issued abroad
amounted to USD 44.7 billion,44 accounting for
only 10% of total international debt securities
issued by developing countries.45 Bonds issued
by Russia accounted for almost 40% of the
total debt securities issued abroad; other
‘ETZ’ countries that tapped international
capital markets to a significant extent were
Israel and South Africa.
Bonds are mainly denominated in US dollars.
Euro-denominated bonds, including bonds
issued in euro legacy currencies, mainly
Deutsche Mark, represent only 27% of total
bonds issued between 1980 and February
2002.
A more precise analysis, however, reveals that
the Western Balkans, i.e. Croatia, issued debt
overwhelmingly in euro and euro legacy
currencies. The share of the euro is also
above average for debt securities issued by
countries from Sub-Saharan Africa, which are
essentially bonds issued by South Africa. On
the other hand, with the exception of Algeria,
Morocco and Tunisia, MENA countries have
almost exclusively issued US dollar-
denominated bonds.
5.2.4 Official development assistance
In the 1990s the ‘ETZ’ countries received
about 50% of all the development funds
provided by donor countries worldwide.
Among the four regions, Sub-Saharan Africa
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Table 5.6
Bonds issued by ‘ETZ’ countries1)
(1980-2002)
As a % of total  Share of euro-
in USD billions ‘ETZ’ denominated bonds2)
Western Balkans 2.9 5.4 87.7
European CIS 21.6 39.9 23.5
MENA 16.5 30.4 14.5
Sub-Saharan Africa 13.2 24.3 36.7
All ‘ETZ’ countries 54.2 100 27.0
Sources: Bondware, own calculations.
1) Excluding offshore centres.
2) Including euro legacy currencies.
44 The figure does not include countries labelled as “offshore
centres” in the joint BIS-IMF-OECD database, such as Bahrain,
Lebanon and Liberia.
45 For the sake of comparison, the value of outstanding debt
securities of all ‘ETZ’ countries is less than the value of total
debt securities issued by Brazil.is the largest aid recipient, which highlights
the importance of official development
assistance (ODA) in total external financing
for this region. MENA countries received
28% of the total, with Egypt and Israel alone
accounting for 15% of total aid to ‘ETZ’
countries. Russia, the third largest recipient,
accounted for more than half of ODA
provided to the European CIS.46 Finally,
financial aid to the Balkans rose by almost
500% in the aftermath of the Dayton Peace
Agreement of 1995, increasing the share of
this sub-region in total ODA funds to ‘ETZ’
countries to 6.5% in the second half of the
1990s.
The EU Member States and the European
Commission are major providers of official
development assistance to ‘ETZ’ countries. In
the period 1995-2000, 51% of total net ODA
flows from members of the OECD’s
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) to
‘ETZ’ countries originated in the EU. The
Western Balkans profited the most from EU
assistance, whereas the EU contributed only
31% of ODA flows to the CIS.Chart 5.4
Table 5.4
EU share in ODA flows to ‘ETZ’ countries
(in percent)





Western Balkans1) 3.7 1.3 6.5
European CIS1) 8.7 7.4 10.3
MENA1) 27.9 31.0 24.2
Sub-Saharan Africa1) 59.8 60.4 59.0
All ‘ETZ’ countries (as a % of world aid) 52.9 54.3 51.3
Worldwide (in USD billions) 502.4 266.9 235.5
Sources: World Bank, own calculations.
1) As a % of all ‘ETZ’ countries.
Over the last decade annual Foreign Direct
Investment (FDI) inflows to ‘ETZ’ countries
increased in line with the trend observable
worldwide, rising from less than USD 8 billion
in 1989-1994 to more than USD 24 billion in
the period 1995-2000. The European CIS was
the main FDI recipient, whereas MENA and
Sub-Saharan Africa lost ground in relative
terms, although in absolute amounts FDI to
these regions more than doubled.47
‘ETZ’ countries account for only 3.4% of total
FDI inflows worldwide. Restricting the analysis
to the group of developing countries, the
share increases to 13%, which is still much
lower than their share in other financial flows
analysed in this section.48
There are a number of obstacles hampering
private investment in the ‘ETZ’ countries, such

























46 The ten largest recipients, accounting for roughly 40% of the
total ODA to ‘ETZ’ countries, were Egypt, Russia, Israel,
Tanzania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Zambia, Mozambique,
Ethiopia, Uganda and Ghana.
47 With regard to FDI inward stocks, in 2000, ‘ETZ’ countries
accounted for 4.3% of total FDI inward stock, valued at
USD 270 billion (which was about the same as the combined
FDI stock of Argentina and Brazil). Since foreign investment in
the Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia was not allowed,
these regions had no FDI history prior to 1989. Accordingly,
their share in total FDI stock within the group of ‘ETZ’ countries
is only gradually increasing. In 2000 they accounted for about
18% of total FDI stock in ‘ETZ’ countries, while MENA and
Sub-Saharan Africa represented  39% and 43% respectively. 
48 ‘ETZ’ countries’ share of FDI outflows is even lower, accounting
for less than 1% of world FDI outflows and only 8.4% of the
FDI outflows from developing countries. However, over the last
decade, Russian companies and individuals became major
foreign investors: in the period 1995-2000 more than 30% of
FDI outflows from ‘ETZ’ countries were from Russia.as political and macroeconomic instability,
poor governance, weak and non-transparent
legal and regulatory frameworks, and a lack of
business opportunities, market size and export
orientation.49 This is why many countries have
a poor FDI record, with some of them, in
particular in Sub-Saharan Africa, having annual
FDI inflows of less than d50 million. FDI
inflows are significant only in resource-rich
countries like Russia, Kazakhstan and
Azerbaijan in the CIS, Angola and Nigeria in
Sub-Saharan Africa, and Saudi Arabia in the
MENA region, where Israel is the only non-oil
country attracting a significant amount of
FDI.50 In some of these countries, however,
FDI inflows actually represent a significant
share (larger than 10%) or even the bulk of
total investment.
In the period 1995-2000, euro area
investments dominated FDI flows to the
Western Balkans and the CIS, whereas in Sub-
Saharan Africa and MENA countries they
represented respectively 45% and 35% of the
total. For all ‘ETZ’ countries, the euro area
accounted for 40% of total FDI inflows.
From a euro area perspective, however, the
Western Balkans and the CIS received only 8%
and 15% of total euro area FDI flows to ‘ETZ’
countries from 1995 to 2000, whereas Sub-
Saharan Africa was the major recipient,
attracting almost half of all euro area FDI to
the four regions. Annual investment patterns
are, however, quite volatile. For example, in
1999 when the political and economic
situation in the Western Balkans and the CIS
improved, the share of these two sub-regions
in total euro area FDI to ‘ETZ’ countries was
35%.
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49 For a detailed account see Broadman and Recanatini (2001),
Agénor, Diwan and Al-Kibbi (2000), Basu and Srinivasan
(2002) and Singh and Jun (1995). 
50 However, it has to be noted that FDI inflows to some of these
countries, for example Saudi Arabia and Russia, have been
highly volatile from one year to the next..
Chart 5.5
Share of euro area countries in
FDI flows to ‘ETZ’ countries
(in percent)
Source: Eurostat, own calculations.
(1995-2000 average)
1) Albania, Croatia, FR Yugoslavia.






























1989-1994 1989-1994 1995-2000 1995–2000
(in USD (as a % of all  (in USD  (as a % of all 
billions) ‘ETZ’ countries) billions) ‘ETZ’ countries)
Western Balkans 0.26 3.4 1.31 4.6
European CIS 1.78 22.8 9.85 40.9
MENA 3.30 42.2 6.44 26.7
Sub-Saharan Africa 2.47 31.6 6.69 27.8
All ‘ETZ’ countries 7.82 - 24.08 -
Sources: UNCTAD, own calculations.Compared to the current level of trade and
financial relations and the goal of further
economic co-operation or integration between
the EU and the “Euro Time Zone”, the role of
the euro in the ‘ETZ’ countries’ exchange rate
regimes is relatively limited. Only in the
Western Balkans and in Sub-Saharan Africa is
the euro a reference currency for the
exchange rate policy of a significant number of
countries. In the CIS and in MENA most
countries peg their currencies to the US
dollar, either de jure or de facto.51 When it
comes to economic determinants, the role of
the euro in the design of exchange rate
policies is generally more important in
countries where the euro is also used as
parallel currency, as it is in the Western
Balkans. The role of the euro is less important
in countries whose trade relations to the EU
are dominated by primary goods, since these
are mostly quoted and invoiced in US dollars.
Many ‘ETZ’ countries rely on external
monetary policy anchors (euro and US dollar)
rather than on domestic anchors, on account
of the widespread absence of developed
financial markets and weak banking systems.
Nevertheless, finding the right balance
between monetary and exchange rate policies
is a challenging task for most central banks,
and some countries have recently tried to
focus more strongly on domestic objectives, in
particular inflation developments. In practice,
however, the exchange rate remains the
dominant channel for monetary policy for
most countries given the preference for a
stable exchange rate motivated by the so-
called “fear of floating”: this arises from the
potential for inflation pass-through stemming
from high exchange rate volatility and the size
of their foreign currency-denominated
liabilities (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002).
6 Exchange rate and monetary policy
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Overall, more than half of the ‘ETZ’ countries
or territories (44 out of 81) have an exchange
rate regime involving an external anchor,
including official euroisation, currency boards
and peg arrangements with either fixed or
crawling rates.52 A total of 14 countries
officially declare that they manage their
currency with no pre-announced path for the
exchange rate, while 23 countries declare that
they have an independent float.
Formally, more than one-third of all ‘ETZ’
countries (29) have an exchange rate
arrangement involving a link to the euro.
These countries are located in the Western
Balkans, MENA and Sub-Saharan Africa (most
notably the CFA franc zone countries).
Conversely, only seven ‘ETZ’ countries
officially declare that their exchange rate
arrangement involves an exclusive link to the
US dollar.53
6.1 Overview of exchange rate policies
Table 6.1
Official exchange rate arrangements in ‘ETZ’ countries
Currency Managed Free
Euroisation Board Pegs float float
Western Balkans 21121
European CIS - - 1 4 3
MENA - - 15 2 1
Sub-Saharan Africa - 1 23 6 18
All ‘ETZ’ countries 2 2 40 14 23
Source: IMF (2001).
51 De jure exchange rate regimes are those arrangements that
are officially declared by the countries concerned and are
classified by the IMF. De facto exchange rate regimes concern
the actual practices of countries, and can only be identified
econometrically.
52 The two examples of euroisation reported in the table,
Montenegro and Kosovo, are not sovereign states but territorial
communities within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.Table 6.2
Exchange rate arrangements involving a link to the euro
Exchange rate regime Number Countries/territorial communities
Euroisation 2 Kosovo, Montenegro
Currency board arrangement 1 Bosnia and Herzegovina
Peg arrangements 17 • Pegging only to the euro: 14 African countries whose legal tender  
(including peg to the SDR  is the CFA franc, plus Cape Verde, Comoros and FYR Macedonia
and other currency baskets 
involving the euro) 5 • Pegging to the SDR1): Botswana, Libya, Qatar2), Saudi Arabia2), 
and the United Arab Emirates2)
3 • Pegging to other currency baskets including the euro: Kuwait2),
Morocco and Seychelles
Crawling fluctuation bands 1 Israel (basket)
Total 29
Source: Ibid.
1) The SDR is a basket of currencies, including the US dollar, the euro, the Japanese yen and the pound sterling.
2) As of January 2003, the currencies of GCC countries will be formally pegged to the US dollar.
However, a reference to the euro does not
necessarily imply a strong and effective euro
orientation in the exchange rate policy of a
country. For instance, the euro may have a
limited share in a currency basket dominated
by the US dollar, as in Kuwait. Hence, de
facto, the presence of the US dollar is more
widespread than officially reported. Indeed,
empirical estimates seem to suggest that many
European CIS and Sub-Saharan countries that
formally declare they have floated their
currencies, have actually pegged them to the
US currency.54
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6.2 Exchange rate policies in the Western Balkans and
Sub-Saharan Africa: a significant role for the euro
Western Balkans
Among ‘ETZ’ countries, geographical proximity
seems to be a key determinant in the choice
of the euro as an external anchor, given that
its influence is strongest in the region which is
closest to the euro area: the Western Balkans.
Here, exchange rate arrangements always
involve the euro, covering almost the full
spectrum of exchange rate regimes, from very
hard pegs to relatively free floats:
• The two largest countries of the region –
Croatia and FR Yugoslavia – together with
FYR Macedonia, tightly manage their
respective currencies against the euro.
Empirical  estimates appear to suggest that
the euro is the only reference currency for
Croatia, while it is the dominant currency
for FYR Macedonia.55
• Bosnia and Herzegovina adopted a currency
board in August 1997 with a 1:1 exchange
rate between the domestic currency, the
konvertible marka (KM), and the German
53 These countries are: Djibouti (currency board); Egypt, Eritrea,
Iraq, Jordan and Oman (peg with fixed bands); and Zimbabwe
(peg with crawling fluctuation bands).
54 See the technical appendix 6.7 for an explanation of the
methodology used to determine whether ‘ETZ’ countries that
declare they have a managed or a pure float de facto peg their
respective currency; see also the empirical results reported in
Table 6.6.
55 Brada and Kutan (2001) even show that base money in
Croatia is linked by a stable long-run (co-integrating)
relationship to base money in Germany, but this is not the case
for FYR Macedonia (or Albania). Empirical results for Yugoslavia
are not reported in Table 6.6 as comprehensive data were
available only at a low (monthly) frequency from the National
Bank of Yugoslavia, resulting in an insufficient number of
degrees of freedom. Since January 2001, when the authorities
officially allowed it to float on the foreign exchange market, the
dinar has been five times more stable (standard deviation-wise)
against the euro than against the US dollar. Prior to this date,
the dinar was officially pegged to the Deutsche Mark.mark. After the introduction of the euro in
1999, the KM remained pegged to the euro.
• Two territories (Kosovo and Montenegro)
have euroised unilaterally and introduced
the euro as legal tender.
• Albania is the only country in the region for
which the US dollar is the main reference
currency, although the estimates reported
in table 6.6 tend to indicate that the euro
may also play a role in the reference basket
of the lek.
The influence of the euro in the Western
Balkans is supported by all of the factors
considered in this paper, as these countries are
tightly tied to the EU in institutional terms and
were granted the status of “potential candidates
to the EU” by the Feira European Council of
June 2000. Moreover, they have substantial
trade and financial links with the euro area.
Lastly, the euro (like its legacy currencies, most
notably the Deutsche Mark and, to some
extent, the Austrian schilling) is used
extensively in the region as a parallel currency.
Sub-Saharan Africa
Partly as a result of history, the euro also
enjoys a substantial role in 14 Sub-Saharan
Africa countries that belong to the CFA franc
zone, and Comoros. Twelve of these countries
had been French colonies and their currencies
had been pegged to the French franc before
World War II.56 The CFA franc zone
encompasses two distinct monetary zones:
• The Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest
Africaine (West African Economic and
Monetary Union) that comprises eight
countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte
d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal
and Togo.
• The Communauté Economique et
Monétaire d’Afrique Centrale (Central
African Economic and Monetary
Community) that comprises six countries:
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad,
Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville),
Equatorial Guinea and Gabon.
The GDP of the whole franc zone represents
only 0.5 % of the GDP of the 15 EU countries.
Its total population is around 90 million. The
West African part is dominated by Côte
d’Ivoire, the Central African part by
Cameroon, which account for 40% and 48% of
the output of their respective regions. Each
monetary zone has its own central bank, the
Banque Centrale des Etats d’Afrique
Occidentale (BCEAO, located in Dakar,
Senegal) and the Banque des Etats d’Afrique
Centrale (BEAC, located in Yaoundé,
Cameroon).57 They issue two distinct
currencies, the Communauté Financière de
l’Afrique (CFA) franc and the Coopération
Financière Africaine (also CFA) franc, along
the same principles:
• Fixed parity with the French franc and,
since 1999, against the euro (100 XFA =
1 FRF or 655.957 XFA = 1 EUR).
• Free capital mobility between France and
the two monetary zones – although a
number of practical constraints exist within
the franc zone – and harmonisation of
exchange control regulations.
• Guarantee of convertibility of the CFA
franc into the French franc by the French
Treasury through the availability, in
principle, of unlimited liquidity in French
francs, as required.58
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56 The “franc des colonies françaises d’Afrique”, or CFA franc, was
established as early as 1948, with a fixed exchange rate
against the French franc. The responsibility for issuing currency
and overseeing the functioning of the zone was shifted to two
regional central banks following the independence of the French
colonies in the early 1960s.
57 Representatives of the French Treasury and the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs sit on the executive boards of the two regional
central banks and on that of the central bank of Comoros. In
addition, a Banque de France representative sits on the BEAC
Executive Board.
58 As stipulated in the EU Council Decision of 23 November
1998, the guarantee of the French Treasury implies only a
commitment of a budgetary nature. In particular, the EU
Council Decision explicitly states that nothing in the agreements
between the franc zone countries and France can be construed
as implying an obligation on the part of the ECB or any other
national central bank of the Eurosystem to support the
convertibility of the CFA franc.• In return, the BCEAO and the BEAC must
keep at least 65% of their foreign assets in
an operation account held at the French
Treasury, provide for exchange cover of at
least 20% of their sight liabilities and impose
a cap on credit extended to each member
country equivalent to 20% of that country’s
public revenue in the preceding year.
The long-standing peg to the French franc has
been both conducive to, and supported by,
strong trade links between the euro area
and the franc zone countries. However, since
the franc zone’s exports are primarily
commodities – for which the price is set on
world markets – they tend to be mainly
invoiced in US dollars.
Furthermore, EMU seems to have had a
“demonstration” effect on West African
countries, providing a reference model of
monetary integration (see Box 6.1).
Conversely, in the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa
(Eastern Africa and Southern Africa) the euro
plays hardly any role.59
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MENA
In MENA, the official reference to the euro in
a number of countries through the SDR (Libya,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates) or
via other currency baskets involving it (e.g.
Kuwait) is, to a large extent, misleading. Only
two countries of Northern Africa, Morocco
and Tunisia, tightly manage de facto their
respective currencies with regard to the euro,
although the US dollar also seems to play a
role in their reference baskets. Morocco, in
particular, pegs its currency to a basket which
reflects the share of the country’s main trading
and financial partners. Although the exact
composition of the basket is not disclosed, the
authorities announced in spring 2001 that they
had increased the euro’s share, probably with
a view to regaining competitiveness vis-à-vis
Morocco’s trading partners further to the
nominal appreciation of the US dollar in recent
years. Indeed, Morocco – together with
Tunisia – has tight trade links with the euro
area which accounts for more than 60% of
their exports and imports. On top of that,
both countries have long-standing relations
with some euro area countries, France in
particular.
Unlike in Morocco and Tunisia, in other
countries a reference to the euro in a
currency basket has not translated into actual
pegging. Oil-producing countries which
formally peg to the SDR (Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi
Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) de facto
peg their currency to the US dollar since that
is the invoicing currency of the commodity
they export. Likewise, other oil-producing
countries such as Algeria, Kuwait, Iraq and
Iran tend to either formally or de facto peg to
the US dollar, probably with a view to
stabilising their export revenues.60
Other MENA countries such as Egypt,
Lebanon and Syria, and, to a lesser extent,
Jordan have close trade ties with the euro
area, but these do not translate into an
exchange rate arrangement focused on the
euro (Sturm, 2001). For instance, Egypt’s trade
with the euro area accounts for over 30% of
total exports and imports (compared with less
6.3  Exchange rate policies in the CIS and MENA countries: 
a limited role for the euro
59 The South African rand is itself a regional anchor currency
within the Common Monetary Area which comprises Lesotho,
Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland.
60 EMU may nevertheless have intellectually influenced the Gulf
region, as there are plans to introduce a single Gulf currency.
At their summit in Manama/Bahrain at the end of 2000, the
heads of state of the six countries of the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) – Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia
and the United Arab Emirates – decided to draw up a working
plan and a timetable to establish a unified currency. They
thereafter agreed at the GCC summit in Muscat at the end of
2001 on the following steps and timetable for the
establishment of a monetary union: (i) by the end of 2002 all
national currencies of GCC countries are to be pegged to the
US dollar, (ii) a legislative framework for a single currency is to
be set up by 2005, (iii) a single currency is to be introduced by
January 2010.than 15% for the United States) but the
country pegs its currency to the US dollar.
Egypt, in particular, embarked on an exchange
rate-based stabilisation programme in 1991,
pegging the pound to the US dollar. This
arrangement served the country well insofar
as it brought inflation down to relatively low
levels; however, it has proved problematic in
recent years because of the appreciation of
the US dollar vis-à-vis the currencies of Egypt’s
main trading partners, which put pressure on
the current account and led to several
devaluations. More flexibility has been
introduced in the exchange rate regime
recently, but discussions on its optimal design
are still ongoing.
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Box 6.1
Monetary integration in West Africa
A recent initiative by five West African states suggests that Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in the
euro area has had a “demonstration effect” in the region: in 1999 the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria and
Sierra Leone launched an ambitious project to set up a second monetary union in West Africa, the West
African Monetary Zone (WAMZ), alongside the existing West African Economic and Monetary Union. The
five countries of the WAMZ have initially committed to a tight timetable whereby they would adopt a
common currency by January 2003 and would work towards merging their monetary zone with the West
African Economic and Monetary Union by January 2004.1 There are recent indications, however, that these
deadlines will be postponed.
EMU is the explicit reference used when setting up the WAMZ:
• An interim institution, akin to the European Monetary Institute, the West African Monetary Institute, is
in charge of the technical preparation of the monetary union, employing staff from all five countries
participating in the project.
• In the run-up to monetary union, countries are required to respect four primary convergence criteria,
some of which resemble the Maastricht criteria applied for EMU: (i) inflation rate in single digits by
2000, coming down to 5% by 2003; (ii) central bank financing of budget deficits below 10% of the
previous year’s tax revenue by 2000; (iii) gross external reserves to cover a minimum of three months
(2000) and six months (2003) of imports; (iv) budget deficit-to-GDP ratio below 5% in 2000 and below
4% in 2002.
• Progress made towards convergence is regularly reviewed by the Convergence Council, an institution that
brings together ministers and central bank governors of the five participating countries.
• With a view to fostering nominal convergence and exchange rate stability, an Exchange Rate Mechanism
has been established, resembling the ERM II mechanism, with +/-15% fluctuation bands. However, given
the countries’ denomination of external debt and trade, the US dollar has been chosen as the reference
currency.2
• An awareness-raising campaign, partially comparable to that for the euro, has been launched to inform
the general public about the forthcoming monetary union.
• The West African Central Bank (WACB) will determine the single monetary policy among the five
countries. The national central banks will be in charge of monetary policy implementation at the national
level. The primary objective of the WACB will be price stability. Price stability is defined as an inflation
rate below 5% when the union is launched.
The planned monetary union would create an area of significant importance in Africa and could be a model
for other developing or emerging market economies. The five countries together have a population of 150
million. Adding the eight Western Africa CFA franc zone countries would increase the area’s total
population to more than 220 million, with a combined GDP of USD 74 billion.
1 For a comprehensive survey on the project, see Masson and Pattillo (2001).
2 There are three main reasons possibly explaining why the US dollar is used as the reference currency for the West African
ERM: (i) the bulk of central banks’ reserves are held in US dollars; (ii) it is the dominant invoicing currency of these
countries’ exports; (iii) it is the prevailing quotation currency of their monies on the foreign exchange market.Like Egypt, Israel embarked on an exchange
rate-based stabilisation strategy in 1985, after
inflation rates had reached three-digit levels. It
first pegged to the US dollar and then
switched to a currency basket. The exchange
rate regime became increasingly flexible over
the course of time as a fluctuation band was
introduced whose width widens automatically
and is currently more than 40%. Israel is
different from the rest of the MENA countries
in that it has managed to almost complete the
transition from an external to an internal
monetary anchor with the successful
introduction of direct inflation targeting in the
early 1990s. However, empirical estimates
seem to suggest that de facto the Israeli shekel
tends to shadow the US dollar.
European CIS
Most countries, including Russia, seem de facto
to peg to the US dollar, although, on average,
more than one-third of their trade is with the
euro area. In particular, the most important
stabilisation tool for the Russian central bank
in the aftermath of the 1998 crisis has been
active interventions on the FX market to
counter the tendency of the rouble to
appreciate in nominal terms. This appreciation
stemmed from strong current account inflows
brought about by favourable oil price
developments. Central bank interventions have
resulted in the rapid accumulation of foreign
exchange reserves. More generally, the strong
US dollar focus of European CIS countries may
be justified by the fact that it is the dominant
parallel currency circulating in the region. In
addition, European CIS countries’ external
liabilities are, to a large extent, like those of
MENA countries, US dollar-denominated,
providing an argument for giving the US dollar
a role in their exchange rate regimes. This is
particularly the case for Russia as it is an
important producer of commodities that tend
to be quoted and invoiced in US dollars.
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The euro is used as a means of payment and a
store of value in the Western Balkans and in
some countries of the Mediterranean. This
means that in these regions the euro circulates
in the form of cash (mainly banknotes) to a
degree that is significant for the economies
concerned, and that also a considerable share
of bank deposits are denominated in euro.
According to Eurosystem estimates, by
September 2002 around EUR 26 billion in
banknotes had been shipped out of the euro
area. While there is widespread evidence that
the bulk is circulating in the Western Balkans,
EU accession countries, and Turkey, there are
no precise details of the geographical
destination of the shipments, with the
exception of one single month. On the
occasion of the cash changeover to the euro
in January 2002, the Eurosystem shipped euro
banknotes one month in advance, in
December 2001, against deposit of collateral
(thereby having an exact information of their
destination). This operation was technically
referred to as “frontloading”, the initial
provision of banknotes to meet initial cash
needs. The country breakdown shows that the
Western Balkans and Northern Africa
together accounted for 25% of the total euro
banknotes frontloaded.
Table 6.3
Frontloading by Eurosystem NCBs of
euro banknotes outside the euro area
(December 2001)
Destination EUR million Share (%)
Turkey 1,502 38.5
Industrialised countries 1,273 32.7
Western Balkans 529 13.6
Northern Africa 436 11.2
Accession countries 121 3.1
Sub-Saharan Africa 25 0.6




6.4 The euro as a parallel currency in the Western Balkans and
the MediterraneanA currency breakdown of foreign currency
deposits reveals that the use of the euro as a
store of value is concentrated in the Balkans.
Outside this region, the share of euro-
denominated deposits drops significantly.
Unfortunately, data on foreign exchange
deposits including a currency breakdown are
missing in several countries.
Table 6.4
Euro-denominated deposits as a
percentage of total foreign currency














The use of the euro as a parallel currency is
particularly high in the Western Balkans. Here,
the euro and its legacy currencies, primarily
the Deutsche Mark (see Seitz, 1995), have
performed all the functions of a parallel
currency over the last decade:
• Means of payment. During the 1990s, at a
time of hyperinflation and banking crises,
the Deutsche Mark was used as a means of
payment in the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, with the population making
payments extensively in foreign banknotes.
• Store of value. Croatia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina currently demonstrate the
second type of use. The population makes
wide use of foreign currency as a financial
asset for savings in banks, but uses it much
less for cash payments. The population uses
the kuna and the convertible marka for
daily transactions, which reflects the
authorities’ achievements in bringing down
inflation. However, the share of foreign
currency deposits over total bank deposits
has continued to increase particularly in
Croatia, notwithstanding improvements in
overall macroeconomic conditions and the
banking system, as banks have offered
foreign currency-denominated products to
their customers as a sign of their renewed
strength.
• Monetary policy device. Croatia also offers
an example of the third type of use.61 The
central bank has regularly issued “Croatian
National Bank Bills” denominated in foreign
currency (DEM/EUR or USD) since 1998.
These debt instruments, which have short-
term maturities (63, 91, 182 and 364 days),
are issued through weekly auctions in which
only domestic credit institutions can
participate. The central bank has also
regularly held foreign currency auctions
to “maintain liquidity of payments in
the country and abroad”, and imposed
reserve requirements on foreign currency
accounts.62
• Legal tender. The cases of Montenegro and
Kosovo illustrate how a foreign currency
can be used as legal tender. Kosovo, a
province of Serbia in the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia, and since 1999 under the
temporary administration of a United
Nations mission (UNMIK), used the
Deutsche Mark as the “preferred currency”
further to UNMIK regulation No. 1999/4.
Likewise, Montenegro, the smaller of the
two member states of the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia, unilaterally declared the
Deutsche Mark parallel legal tender to the
Yugoslav dinar in November 1999. In
January 2001 the Deutsche Mark became
sole legal tender. In early 2002, both
territories successfully operated the
changeover to euro banknotes.
In contrast, many countries in the CIS, MENA
and Sub-Saharan Africa do not use the euro as
a parallel currency and are instead
characterised by a high degree of US dollar-
based currency and asset substitution. This is,
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61 Other cases are Montenegro and, among the accession
countries, Slovenia.
62 Croatian National Bank (2002).for instance, the case of the largest economies
of the European CIS (Russia, Ukraine and
Kazakhstan) and the countries of the Caucasus
(Georgia and Armenia). Russian households
still resort extensively to foreign cash as a
means of transactions and a store of value, in
particular US dollar banknotes, even if recently
there have been signs of an increasing interest
in euro banknotes. The share of foreign
currency deposits in total deposits in Russia
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Box 6.2
The economics of a parallel currency
The “parallel currency” concept is multifaceted. For analytical reasons, economists differentiate between
four uses: (I) as a means of payment; (II) as a store of value; (III) as a monetary policy device, and (IV) as
legal tender.1
1 Means of payment
Households may use a foreign currency to carry out domestic payments, a phenomenon called, “currency
substitution”. In economies suffering from (sometimes extraordinarily) high inflation and distortions in the
price mechanism, referring to a foreign currency is a convenient way to measure the relative scarcity of
goods. The reference to a foreign currency is normally limited to transactions involving large amounts of
money (e.g. the purchase of real estate or cars) or regular payments (e.g. the payment of a rent); in extreme
cases, it may be also extended to the pricing of all retail goods.
2 Store of value
Foreign banknotes may be also used as a store of value, for instance in the form of “under the mattress”
banknote holdings. However, economic agents may resort to more sophisticated devices, for instance by
opening a foreign currency-denominated bank account or purchasing other foreign currency-denominated
financial assets. This is called, “asset substitution”. Likewise, governments and corporations may solicit
investors to purchase foreign currency-denominated assets, by issuing domestic securities denominated in
that foreign currency. Alternatively, governments may directly turn to foreign investors to cover the bulk of
their domestic financing needs. Credit institutions receiving deposits in foreign currency may hedge their
foreign exchange exposure by granting foreign currency-denominated loans to domestic companies. The
latter may have incentives to keep a substantial part of their liquid assets in foreign currency if a large part
of their turnover depends on foreign trade.
3 Monetary policy device
If monetary aggregates are predominantly in a foreign currency, the central bank may conduct monetary
policy operations in that currency, too, as an additional vehicle for operations with the banking system. For
instance, the central bank may issue short-term debt securities in foreign currency and repo them against
foreign currency deposits. It may modify the conditions applying to reserve requirements on financial
liabilities in foreign currency, as a direct monetary policy instrument. The central bank may also decide to
set up financial infrastructures – e.g. wholesale payment systems – explicitly dedicated to supporting
domestic activities in foreign currencies.
4 Legal tender
Lastly, a country may officially decide to forego its own currency, assigning legal tender status to a foreign
currency. As a result, the foreign currency becomes the official national currency and acquires all the
attributes of the domestic currency. All contractual relations and any other monetary obligations (including
non-contractual ones) are operated in the foreign currency. Other changes are introduced in parallel in the
monetary sphere, for instance modifications of the competencies of monetary authorities, amendments to
banking legislation, new conditions for the implementation of contractual obligations, etc.
1 For a literature review, see Baliño, Bennett and Borensztein (1999).has decreased somewhat since the historical
high registered shortly after the August 1998
financial crisis, but still accounted for 38% at
the end of 2001.
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With the exception of Morocco and Tunisia,
the role of the euro in the exchange rate
policies of CIS and MENA countries seems to
be considerably less developed than their
significant institutional, trade and financial
relations with the EU and the euro area would
imply. This is somewhat surprising in view of
the standard optimal currency area literature
which maintains that trade direction, financial
links and the choice of the reference currency
for exchange rate policy should be inherently
intertwined. On the one hand, excessive
exchange rate volatility may, at least in theory,
be a major impediment to trade. On the other
hand, strong and increasing trade relations are
seen as a precondition for a more rigid
exchange rate arrangement within a group of
countries, as they increase the correlation of
business cycles, thereby reducing the
probability of asymmetric shocks.64
One element explaining this apparent
contradiction is the high share of primary
goods in CIS and MENA exports to the EU.
Most primary goods are traded on world
markets and tend to be mainly quoted and
priced in US dollars (ECB, 2001a). Accordingly,
although the trade relations of most ‘ETZ’
countries are clearly dominated by trade with
the EU, this does not imply that the
orientation of domestic monetary and
exchange rate policies towards the euro
would help reduce terms-of-trade shocks. A
6.5 Exchange rate arrangements, trade structures and oil invoicing
Box 6.3
Energy invoicing and network externalities
Today, oil price formation occurs through the complex interaction of spot, term and futures trading for
different qualities of crude oil, with three major reference points: London (the Brent market for North Sea
oil), Dubai and New York. London strongly influences price formation everywhere outside North America,
including the Dubai market. The use of one currency (the US dollar) in all markets for energy creates
important network externalities, which thus favours the status quo.
Given these network externalities, a “critical mass” would be required to make possible a partial switch to
a multi-currency quotation system (for instance, New York quoting prices in US dollars and London in
euro). A switch to a multi-currency system could be only initiated by those oil producers that have
particularly close trade ties with the euro area. This would primarily apply to the North Sea oil producers,
the United Kingdom and Norway, but also to Russia and North African producers like Algeria and Libya,
which together account for approximately 25% of world oil production. Oil producers on the American
continent with close links to the US, like Mexico and Venezuela, would have no incentive to follow such a
move, and the Gulf producers would find themselves somewhere in the middle.
Of course, any transition to a multi-currency quotation system might complicate interaction on oil markets.
Therefore, it would have to have very strong support from operators ready to accept higher transaction costs
during the initial phase. Some authors believe that any competitive coexistence between the US dollar and
the euro in the oil market would not last any great length of time as it would tend to be unstable. In the
longer run, in all likelihood, they maintain that one of the two currencies would have to prevail (Noreng,
1999).
64 This is the view of the optimum currency area literature.
However, since standard Ricardian theory suggests that as
countries specialise more in production, as their trade relations
increase, they could become more vulnerable to asymmetric
shocks, creating a need for the exchange rate to become more
flexible, so that economies can adjust to these shocks. Empirical
evidence provided by Frankel (1999) supports the view that
stronger trade relations are linked with higher income
correlation, reducing vulnerability to asymmetric shocks.crucial issue for CIS and MENA countries is
therefore the invoicing of energy (oil and gas)
in US dollars.65
This line of reasoning is supported by the fact
that the euro’s role is more prominent in the
Western Balkans and some Maghreb countries
such as Tunisia and Morocco. The share of
trade with the EU in these countries is
somewhat above average, but the main
qualitative difference with other ‘ETZ’
countries is that trade relations with the EU
are less dominated by primary goods.
However, it has to be acknowledged that
there are other ‘ETZ’ countries with similar
characteristics, for example Egypt and
Lebanon, which are nevertheless largely US
dollar-oriented. This suggests that trade is an
important, but by no means the only or the
decisive criterion of monetary links between
countries.
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Over the last two decades a broad consensus
has been reached in academic and policy-
making circles alike with regard to the final
objective of monetary policy (price stability),
the institutional set-up of the central bank
(independence) and the choice of instruments
(market-based or indirect instruments). While
the ECB’s monetary policy framework
definitely reflects this consensus, that of many
‘ETZ’ central banks is also guided by these
principles.66
Central banks are given a clear legal mandate
to maintain the internal and external stability
of their respective currencies.67 In some cases
(e.g. Armenia, Croatia, Israel, Kenya, South
Africa, Tanzania and Tunisia) price stability is
openly referred to, although it is only precisely
defined in Israel and South Africa which have
adopted a direct inflation targeting strategy.68
Some central banks, in particular in Sub-
Saharan Africa and MENA countries, are
assigned other, broader, objectives.69 For
instance, central banks in Mauritius, Oman,
South Africa, Ukraine and in the West African
Economic and Monetary Union have to
promote economic growth, while in Algeria,
Botswana, Croatia, Qatar and the United Arab
Emirates they are required to support
economic policies conducted by other public
authorities.
Turning to the instruments available to central
banks to reach their respective objectives,
most claim to use the full spectrum of direct
and indirect monetary policy instruments, such
as reserve requirements, standing facilities and
open-market operations. In practice, however,
most central banks are still faced with a
number of challenges, including the
establishment of their independence in a
difficult institutional environment, gaining
credibility without an appropriate inflation
track record, and pursuing disinflation
programs. In particular, inflation has still failed
to reach single-digit levels in the largest part of
the European CIS and of Sub-Saharan Africa
(South Africa being a notable exception) over
recent years (see Chart 6.1).70 In contrast to
these regions, the large majority of MENA
countries have managed in recent years to
6.6 Key features of monetary policy
65 For an overview of this issue see Noreng (1999).
66 As a brief reminder, the salient features of the ECB’s monetary
policy are: (i) a commitment, as a prime objective, to price
stability which is clearly defined as an increase in the
harmonised index of consumer prices of below 2% over the
medium term; (ii) without prejudice to this objective, support for
EU economic policies; (iii) a two-pillar strategy based on (a) a
reference value for the growth of money supply and (b) a
broadly based assessment of the outlook for future price
developments; and (iv) the use of a variety of monetary policy
instruments, namely regular refinancing operations, standing
facilities, fine-tuning operations and minimum reserve
requirements (ECB, 2001b).
67 See Table 6.5 for details.
68 In Israel the inflation target, set by the government in
consultation with the central bank, is between 1 and 3% per
year from 2003 onwards, while in South Africa the inflation
target (average CPI growth) is between 3 and 6% for 2002.
69 This obviously comes on top of other operational functions, such
as the issuance of the domestic currency, or of other tasks
which are not directly related to monetary policy per se, such
as the supervision of the banking and of the financial sectors.
70 Average inflation figures in the Western Balkans exclude Bosnia
and Herzegovina as well as Yugoslavia, owing to data
unavailability. Likewise, average inflation figures in MENA
exclude Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, the Palestinian Territories and the
United Arab Emirates, while in Sub-Saharan Africa they exclude
Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Liberia, Mayotte, São Tomé &
Príncipe and Zambia.bring their inflation rates down to close to
euro area levels, mainly by successfully pegging
their currencies to an external anchor.
Inflation has been reduced to very low levels in
the Western Balkans, except in FR Yugoslavia.
Although there are some exceptions, the
widespread absence of developed financial
markets, combined with weak banking
systems, weighs heavily on practical monetary
policy implementation in a large number of
‘ETZ’ countries. In particular, money markets
are often undersized and skewed towards very
short-term maturities (from overnight to a few
weeks), with few active transactions between
banks, while refinancing operations with the
central bank account for the bulk of market
activity. Indirect monetary instruments are
hardly used and are undermined by a number
of obstacles such as a lack of collateral and
insufficient market liquidity. In some cases,
direct monetary policy instruments are the
most widely used device, including high
minimum reserve ratios, binding legal ceilings
on lending rates and restrictions on banks’
portfolio allocation, sometimes with a view to
dragging resources toward sectors considered
to be strategic.71 Faced with these challenges
to the control of their domestic money supply,
most ‘ETZ’ countries have tried to rely on an
external anchor, thereby limiting their ability
to conduct a purely domestically-focused
monetary policy.
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Chart 6.1
Inflation in ETZ countries
(Unweighted arithmetic averages of yearly changes in consumer prices, in percent)



























71 This is not the case in the inflation targeting economies, Israel
and South Africa, as pointed out in Schaechter (2000); these
enjoy larger and relatively more developed financial systems
than most ‘ETZ’ countries.Table 6.5
Overview of the monetary policy framework in selected ‘ETZ’ countries
(as of mid-2002)
Objective(s) Instruments
Currency Additional Intermediate Minimum Other direct Standing Open-market
Country stability objective(s)* target reserves (%) instruments facilities operations
Western Balkans
Bosnia-Herz.   - - 10 Currency board arrangement
Croatia1) Price stability Support N.a. 19 N.a.   
economic policy
FYR Macedonia   N.a. Euro/denar 3.5-8 Credit ceilings   
exchange rate




Armenia Price stability N.a. Broad money 8 Influence on the   
and base money “reference rate
of bank interest”
Azerbaijan   N.a. N.a. 10    
Georgia   N.a. N.a.   Temporary  
credit restrictions
Moldova   N.a. N.a. 7 N.a.   
Kazakhstan   N.a. N.a. N.a. N.a.   
Russia   N.a. N.a. 10 N.a.   
Ukraine   Economic growth M3 15 N.a.   
Middle East and Northern Africa
Algeria   “Orderly” N.a. N.a. N.a.   
development of 
the economy
Egypt   N.a. N.a. 15 N.a.   
Israel2) Price stability Economic No Unused N.a.   
growth
Kuwait   N.a. N.a. N.a. Lending rate   
ceilings
Morocco   N.a. M1 Credit ceilings, restrictions on   
interest rates and loans have 
been abolished
Oman   Sustained Exchange   Credit, deposit   
economic rate stability and interest rate
growth ceilings
Qatar   Support national Exchange rate  2.75% Lending limits   
economy stability
Saudi Arabia   N.a. Exchange rate  7 Liquidity    
stability reserve ratios
Tunisia Price stability Real exchange  M2, M3, M4 N.a. N.a.   
rate stability
United Arab   Support national  Exchange  1%-30% Lending, interest   N.a.
Emirates economy rate peg rates and fees limits
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Objective(s) Instruments
Currency Additional Intermediate Minimum Other direct Standing Open-market
Country stability objective(s)* target reserves (%) instruments facilities operations
Sub-Saharan Africa
Botswana   Support N.a.   Control of     N.a.
development credit  and
goals credit interest
Ghana   N.a. Money,     No policy rate  
credit aggregates
Kenya Price stability N.a. N.a. Cash ratio  N.a.   
requirements
Mauritius   Strengthen N.a. No longer used   
economic 
prosperity
Rwanda   N.a. N.a. 8% N.a.   
South Africa3) Price stability Sustainable  No 2.5% (Not     
growth actively used)
Tanzania Price stability N.a. Money supply,    N.a.   
reserves, exchange 
rate stability
WAEMU   Economic Coverage of Varies across  Ex-post control    
growth base money countries of credit quality
by reserves
Source: information released by central banks on their respective websites. 
Note: (*) other than financial or banking stability; (  ) qualifies for the respective category; (N.a.) Not available.
1) The central bank issues short-term securities (“bills”) in euro (as well as in kuna and US dollars).
2) Direct inflation targeting since 1992 (target 1-3% from 2003 onwards).
3) Direct inflation targeting since 2000 (average CPI growth between 3% and 6% for 2002).
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The method first outlined by Frankel and Wei
(1994) is used to examine whether ‘ETZ’
countries that declare officially that they float,
manage or peg their currency to a foreign
currency or a basket of currencies, in fact peg
it to the US dollar or the euro.
To this end, the following OLS regression is run:
where the local currency e is regressed on a
constant, α , the euro, the US dollar and the
Japanese yen (used as a control variable), with
the Swiss franc used as the numeraire; the β
coefficients are the parameters (weights of the
basket) to be estimated, and ε t is a well-
behaved disturbance term.72 The model is
estimated for 37 ‘ETZ’ currencies for which
data are available from Bloomberg, sampled at a
weekly frequency in the first two years of the
euro’s existence (January 1999 to February 2001).
The results are shown in Table 6.6. Each entry
represents the percentage change in the local
6.7 Technical appendix: Revealing de facto exchange rate pegging in
‘ETZ’ countries
∆ ln[(e/CHF)t] = α + β 1∆ ln[(EUR/CHF)t] + β 2∆ ln[(USD/CHF)t] + β 3∆ ln[(JPY/CHF)t] + ε t
72 All variables are in (natural) log form; ∆ stands for the first-
difference operator and the subscript t for time. The Swiss
franc was chosen as numeraire as the latter should not be
correlated with the currencies of the basket (to minimise
multicolinearity-type problems). For other applications of the
Frankel and Wei (1994) methodology (on Asian currencies),
see McKinnon (2000) or Bank of England (2000), who also
use the Swiss franc as numeraire, or Benassy-Quéré and
Coeuré (2000) for an in-depth discussion of the problems
raised by the choice of the numeraire and the limitations of this
methodology.Table 6.6
De facto exchange rate pegging in ‘ETZ’ countries
Country (currency) Euro US dollar Japanese yen
Western Balkans
Albania (lek) 0.471) 0.771) -0.04
Croatia (kuna) 0.951) 0.14 -0.01
FYR Macedonia (denar) 1.131) 0.581) -0.09
European CIS
Armenia (dram) 0.252) 0.981) 0.00
Azerbaijan (manat) -0.07 0.981) -0.04
Belarus (rouble) 0.45 0.791) 0.17
Georgia (lari) -0.19 1.041) -0.22
Ukraine (hryvnia) 0.13 1.341) -0.22
Kazakhstan (tenge) -0.25 0.931) 0.03
Moldova (leu) 0.36 0.701) 0.213)
Russia (rouble) -0.56 0.921) -0.02
Middle East and Northern Africa
Algeria (dinar) 0.682) 0.561) -0.05
Bahrain (dinar) 0.00 0.991) 0.00
Israel (shekel) 0.23 0.921) 0.06
Iraq (dinar) -0.16 1.111) -0.01
Iran (rial) -0.04 0.991) 0.00
Jordan (dinar) 0.083) 1.001) -0.01
Kuwait (dinar) 0.091) 0.881) 0.031)
Lebanon (pound) 0.04 0.981) 0.00
Morocco (dirham) 0.571) 0.421) 0.04
Oman (rial) 0.093) 0.991) 0.00
Qatar (riyal) 0.00 1.001) 0.00
Syria (pound) -0.23 0.891) 0.04
Tunisia (dinar) 0.851) 0.371) 0.00
United Arab Emirates (dirham) 0.00 1.001) 0.00
Sub-Saharan Africa
Burundi (franc) -0.31 -0.611) 0.362)
Botswana (pula) -0.682) -0.10 0.08
Democratic Republic of the Congo (franc) -0.60 -0.13 0.21
Eritrea (nafka)  -0.87 -0.09 0.08
Ghana (cedi) -1.353) 0.18 0.22
The Gambia (dalasi) -0.48 -0.10 0.04
Guinea (franc) -0.17 -0.15 0.09
Kenya (shilling) -0.643) 0.12 0.01
Malawi (kwacha) -0.37 0.00 0.00
Mozambique (metical) -0.52 -0.14 0.18
Nigeria (naira) -0.62 -0.06 0.19
Tanzania (shilling) -0.48 0.07 0.05
Note: (1), (2), (3) indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level of confidence respectively.
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currency with respect to a 1% change in the
euro, the US dollar and the Japanese yen
respectively. For example, a 1% change in the
exchange rate of the euro vis-à-vis the Swiss
franc was typically associated with a 0.95%
change in the exchange rate of the Croatian
kuna against the Swiss franc in the same week.This paper has explored the intensity of
economic relations between the euro area and
a set of around 80 emerging, developing or
transition economies located in four regions:
the Western Balkans; the European part of the
Commonwealth of Independent States; the
Middle East and Northern Africa; and Sub-
Saharan Africa. These countries, for the sake
of simplicity and with some degree of
arbitrariness, have been labelled together as
belonging to the “Euro Time Zone”. They are
not candidates for EU accession and, for the
most part, are not even in Europe.
The analysis showed that the Western Balkans
is the region most tightly linked to the euro
area in economic terms. It is also the region
with the highest potential for integration with
the EU, the strongest institutional ties, where
the euro plays the greatest role in the
countries’ monetary and exchange rate
policies, and the region with the strongest
presence of euro area banks.
Of the other three regions, the European CIS
is the one with particularly strong banking
links to the euro area, while the links with
Sub-Saharan Africa are based mainly on trade,
the monetary relations between France and
the CFA franc zone, and official development
assistance flows. In absolute terms, MENA
countries are, by far, the main trading and
financial partners of the EU. This mainly
reflects their higher income levels compared
with the other regions, in particular in the
resource-rich economies like those of the
Arabian Peninsula, and the importance of oil
imports for the EU.
However, despite their diversity, the four
regions have a number of interesting features
in common:
• While bilateral agreements between the EU
and other regions in the world, such as
Latin America or Asia, also exist,
institutional links with many ‘ETZ’ countries
have a much longer history, cover a much
wider range of issues and exhibit – on
average – a stronger commitment to
economic integration and co-operation
from both sides.
• Indeed, while the euro area has developed
significant trade relations with Latin
America and Asia, in the group of
developing countries ‘ETZ’ countries are
more dependent on EU trade than other
regions are. Likewise, of all the members of
this group the ‘ETZ’ countries represent
the largest export market and the second
largest import market for the EU. In
particular, ‘ETZ’ countries are the main
suppliers of agricultural goods, raw
materials and fuels, accounting for more
than 60% of EU imports in these products.
In particular, energy is of crucial importance
for the euro area.
• ‘ETZ’ countries are the main debtors of
euro area banks among the group of
developing countries and the largest
recipients of official aid provided by the EU.
Moreover, they are highly dependent on the
euro area and the EU with regard to bank
lending, official development assistance and
FDI flows.
Compared with the intensity of institutional,
trade and financial links, the role of the euro in
exchange rate policies of the 80 countries is
relatively limited. To date, even ‘ETZ’
countries with strong links to the euro area
economies seem to have preferred a reference
to the US dollar in their exchange rate
policies. Nevertheless, the euro is the
currency of reference of the Western Balkans,
and an important anchor for some countries in
Sub-Saharan Africa and Northern Africa.
Overall, countries that are either
geographically particularly close to the euro
area (often direct neighbours) and historically
linked to it have the strongest institutional,
trade, financial and monetary links with the
euro area. There is rather more mixed
evidence with regard to countries well
endowed with natural resources: while trade
and financial links are strong, monetary links
are rather weak. This seems to be the case
because natural resources are traded on world
7 Final remarks
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Overview of the links between ‘ETZ’ countries and the euro area
(in percent)
Type of link Western  European Sub-Saharan All ‘ETZ’
Balkans CIS MENA Africa countries
Institutional links
Agreements Stabilisation Partnership  and Euro-Med- Cotonou 
and Association  Co-operation  Agreements Agreement
Agreements. Agreements.
Status as  Promotion of Euro- Preconditions
potential  trade, investment Mediterranean for future 
candidate for  and economic free trade area  liberalisation
EU membership. relations. targeted for 2010  of trade
Trade links













Share of euro area 82 85 58 58 67 
banks in total BIS 
reporting banks’
claims on the 
region, 1995-2000
Share of euro- 68 37 21 21 25
denominated bank 
claims in total 
bank claims on 
the region, 2000




to the region, 
1995-2000
Share of FDI  68 54 35 45 40
flows originating 
from euro area 





Role of the euro  Very large Small Small Large1)/small
as a reference 
currency
Degree of  High Low Low Low
unofficial 
euroisation
Source: authors’ compilation, based on sections 3-6.
1) CFA franc zone.
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dollars, while exports tend to be invoiced
almost exclusively in US dollars.
Hence, the evidence provided in this paper
suggests that there are strong institutional and
economic relations between the euro area and
the four regions subsumed under the heading
“Euro Time Zone”. Given that these countries,
located in relatively close geographical
proximity to the euro area, receive less
attention than other emerging market
economies, this conclusion is of relevance
both for the ‘ETZ’ countries and the euro
area. Moreover, with the forthcoming EU
enlargement, these links may well become
even stronger in the future.
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